

Poststructuralist Geographies
The Diabolical Art of Spatial Science

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Let us space. The art of this text is the air it causes to circulate between its screens. The chainings are invisible, everything seems improvised or juxtaposed. This text induces by agglutinating rather than demonstrating, by coupling and decoupling, gluing and ungluing [*en accolant et en décollant*] rather than by exhibiting the continuous, and analogical, instructive, suffocating necessity of a discursive rhetoric.

Jacques Derrida, *Glas*

For a hinge-logic, a hinge-style.

Jean-François Lyotard, *Duchamp's TRANS/formers*

... an infernal machine is being assembled.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*

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Introduction – opening poststructuralist geography

Speaking always as geographers. (Deleuze, 1983a, p. 83)

It is not only time that is 'out of joint,' but space, space in time, spacing.
(Derrida, 1994b, p. 83)

The ethic of geography

You are a slow little stream. You will be passed by fast little streams ...
She tells herself that thought takes time and there's nothing you can do
about it ... That doesn't much resemble streams. Ponds, rather. You
flounder in them ...

Conclusion: the true streams are subterranean, they stream slowly beneath
the ground, they make headwaters and springs: You can't know where
they'll surface. And their speed is unknown. I would like to be an under-
ground cavity full of black, cold, and still water. (Lyotard, 1997, p. 5)

It is much easier to become swept up by a powerful current than it is
to be the origin of a great effort. In the present conjuncture, many
human geographers have become swept up by currents loosely referred
to as poststructuralist, deconstructive, or postmodern; currents which
braid in innumerable ways with others within critical human geography,
such as Marxism, feminism, and postcolonialism. Despite their manifold
nature, signified most clearly in the recent pluralization and hybridization
of what were often considered to be broadly unitary perspectives, these
currents can be said to flow through the dissolution of the postpositivist
closure of theoretical debates within the frame of reference staked out
by humanism and structuralism; often streaming through channels first
carved out by structuration theory and critical realism in the wake of a
rejuvenated time-geographical insistence on the indissociability of space
and time, as both contexts and outcomes of human practice (see, for
example: Carlstein, Parkes and Thrift, 1978a, 1978b; Cloke, Philo and
Sadler, 1991; Gregory and Urry, 1985; Kobayashi and MacKenzie, 1989;
Peet, 1998; Thrift, 1983, 1996b).

It is not my intention to chart either these currents or the dissolution of the closure of human geography between the pincer movement of structure and agency. Interesting though both of these are, they barely tap into the enormous, subterranean revolution in the art of spatial science that has been taking place in fields as diverse as quantum physics, sociology, and philosophy. And it is this revolution that I have been swept up by. So, for strategic reasons, rather than dwell on the contemporary nature and practice of critical human geography, or detail the various ways in which geography and geographers have taken up the postmodern, poststructural, and deconstructive currents, I will attempt a much more modest task that will, in spite of my desire, entail a great effort on our part: to outline my take on poststructuralist geography. From the outset I should say that this is not the correct version. It is just a version – a pop-philosophical remix –, which affects you or not, which is becoming or unbecoming, fitting or ill-mannered. Such an evaluation is always contextual and determined by the manifold ways in which the work is taken up, the paths by which it goes off and becomes otherwise. Here we are close to Deleuze and Guattari's (1984) *schizoanalysis* – a discordant mode of existence that is perpetually breaking down and in flight from itself; an insatiable deterritorialization evoked by the excessive force of what happens to us (cf. Baudrillard, 1988c; Guattari, 1996; Jameson, 1984). Such a schizoanalysis should not be confused with Lefebvre's (1991, 1996) *rhythm analysis* – whose employment in the putting of “the finishing touches to the exposition of the production of space” is put in the service of “the necessary and inevitable restoration of the total body” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 405). The space of the work, along with its libidinal economy and affective machinery, is always in process and never totalizable. Its mode of existence is becoming-otherwise than what it will have been (*post modo*). So while I sympathize with the need for a “rhythm analysis” that would demonstrate how “The repetitions and redundancies of rhythms, their symmetries and asymmetries, interact in ways that cannot be reduced to the discrete and fixed determinants of analytic thought” and how “the body . . . is traversed by rhythms rather as the ‘ether’ is traversed by waves” I hesitate before the expectation of a “general rhythmology” whose “preferred spheres of experiment” would be “the sphere of ‘rhythmic cells’ and their effects” (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 205–6).

Accordingly, to be worthy of the events that have effected this work is not to confine them to a total corpus; to bind them in a veritable straight-jacket bearing the tag ‘Poststructuralist Geography,’ for example. It is rather to affirm and enact their own becoming-otherwise. Everything is in a state of becoming. There are only events that affect you or not, with all of the necessary couplings and redistributions of energy, cast adrift in an “open ‘space-time’ in which there are no more

identities but only transformations” (Lyotard, 1988b, p. 31). It is always a matter of how to plug oneself into a milieu without choking off the infinite array of other modes of existence that could have been drawn out of its event horizon. This is why even the most minimal of events can be unfolded, recomposed, and interpreted in innumerable ways. One will never be finished with the task of doing justice to the event: of reading and re-reading, of thinking and re-thinking, of repeating and differing. Therefore, my paracitation and close reading of others will not be in an attempt to pin things down to a fundamental or essential kernel of absolute meaning. One reads closely in order to differentiate and discriminate: to give rise to new events, “to give space for singular events” (Derrida, 1994c, p. 55). If there is a law of space, the expression of which remains the dream of spatial science, then it is a *harsh* law, as Derrida (1976) once put it. For geography degree zero is infinitely dense: it takes place along what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) called ‘a hundred thousand lines of flight.’ There are infinite infinities folded into each event of space and spacing. The minimal element is always already maximal in its disjointure: it is not a *point* (a mere given), but a *singularity* – in the mathematical sense of infinite disjointure or infinite density. If poststructuralist geography proves irritating and unsettling to established and sedentary ways of spatial science, then it is because of this insistence and affirmation of the iterability of the event in its insatiable becoming-otherwise than what it will have been. Supporting poststructuralist geography is neither a foundation nor an ontology. Rather, it is carried by an immanent vibration and solicitation: Pefanis (1991, p. 85) aptly refers to his “narration of the heterodoxical tradition of French thought” – Bataille, Baudrillard, Lyotard, etc. – as a “cartography of a ruptured and abyssal territory.” The notion of a single narration and cartography is problematic, however, since every portion of the terrain is out of joint. This is why a schizoanalytic and cancerous proliferation of ‘minor-languages’ (Deleuze and Guattari) and ‘little narratives’ (Lyotard) surges through “the space of the fallen idols, in the demise of transhistorical and transcendental values” (Pefanis, 1991, p. 90). What we need is “a delirious cartography of thousands of plateaux, each one a shifting ice flow [*sic*]” (Fuller, 1992, p. 169). Poststructuralist geography is a driftwork, a wanton abandonment, an active nihilism.

“Events are fluvia,” suggests Deleuze (1993b, p. 79). Everything is in perpetual motion, even if that vibration is often turned back on itself to simulate a constancy, consistency, or rhythmic cell. Insofar as this work takes place, it is a conductor and a vibrator. In consequence, my take on poststructuralist geography entails letting myself get taken up by such a vibration. And insofar as the whole exercise is to affirm the becoming-otherwise of spatial science, to make space for new events

and moves in the geographical tradition, neither its trajectory nor its effects can be prefigured and rehearsed in advance. One can never know beforehand how an event will play out, spin out, and splay out, or with what other currents it will become swept up. It is the destiny of every work to be given over to chance (cf. Botting and Wilson, 1998). Yet even though a work is fated to adestation, dissemination, and undecidability, there will nevertheless be innumerable ways in which it is taken up, plugged in, and transformed along the way.

If, then, the work never finally takes place, its interminable and labyrinthine peregrination is nevertheless an occasion for new moves in spatial science. Something will happen to us – or not. You will take it up – or leave it. You will plug yourself in and get swept up by it – or not. Either way, neither you nor I will have exhausted what is in the process of coming into geography. And doing justice to that is the ethic specific to poststructuralist geography: opening oneself to “the dizziness that can take hold of thinking” (Lyotard, 1988b, p. 13). So, “If something can be said about the work that has not yet been said, then it is because it is listened to otherwise,” writes Lyotard (1997, p. 139). “In this other *écoute* resides the respect one owes to writing and to thought.” Another way of putting this is to say that one has a duty to be worthy of the events that happen to us, to borrow a Deleuzian formulation. What matters, then, are the events and affects that the work gives rise to, events and affects that will only have taken place in relation to a constitutive outside, of which your reading is a necessary and absolutely singular component. “There is, therefore, in the work of writing and thought a pragmatic indeterminacy or an indeterminacy of destination,” says Lyotard (1997, p. 139).

In their becoming-other, the schizoid figures that compose this book – Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Harvey, Irigaray, Lyotard, and Olsson, amongst others – are symptoms of poststructuralist geography. These names are neither personal nor authorial, and still less do they index a total body of work. Rather, they lend consistency to particular configurations of signs and symptoms, each composing a particular way of existing in the world. If one gives a body of signs a proper name, such as ‘Baudrillard’ or ‘Deleuze,’ it is because of the new symptomatology that they propose.

A sign is a symptom of the adestation that accompanies the other *écoutes* for the work. It is symptomatic of the deforming force that is felt in the flesh of the work insofar as it is affected by what is other than what it will have been. This is why a body of signs is never integral, but differential. Every sign is split and given over to dissimulation: cracked-words and cracked-bodies, no less than cracked-I’s. In the libidinal economy of psychoanalysis, this splaying force is a return of the repressed, of what has been occluded and ‘occulted’ in the folding

(interiorization) of consciousness – the collective (i.e. impersonal) unconscious. In the libidinal economy of schizoanalysis, it is the force of the open. “Open the so-called body and spread out all its surfaces,” suggests Lyotard:

perform the dissection of polymorphous perversion, spread out the immense membrane of the libidinal ‘body’ ... made from the most heterogeneous textures, bone, epithelium, sheets to write on, charged atmospheres, swords, glass cases, peoples, grasses, canvases to paint. All these zones are joined end to end in a band which has no back to it, a Möbius band which interests us not because it is closed, but because it is one-sided, a Möbius skin. (Lyotard, 1993, pp. 1–2)

On the ‘great ephemeral sk(e)in’ of the libidinal band, a symptom is metamorphic: it redistributes force and affect. “If the symptom is a metaphor, it is not a metaphor to say so,” writes Lacan (1977, p. 175). “For the symptom *is* a metaphor whether one likes it or not.” In his explication of this passage, Ferrell (1996, p. 83) rightly notes:

To read the symptom as metaphor is not to believe that it is ‘merely metaphoric.’ *The symbolic has being; better, the symbolic produces being.* If there is a strength in Lacan’s account it is that he makes it impossible to have a sign divorced from its material because the symptom is a material event, its pain has meaning and an experience of life is bound up to it ... a representation is not true, rather, it *is*, it has being.

Now, despite the hostility between schizoanalysis and psychoanalysis, they at least have this in common: a symptom is a material event; it takes place. In short, the fabrication of a poststructuralist geography necessitates a symptomatological approach. One reworks the symptoms of spatial science and redistributes the play of forces composing them (cf. Olsson, 1980, 1991). But the symptomatology that ‘isolates’ poststructuralist geography as a specific syndrome is no ordinary clinical or critical practice of discrimination. For the immanent mode of existence that it implies is schizophrenic, as sketched in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Anti-Oedipus* (1984). As Daniel Smith (1997, p. xx–xxi) writes in his introduction to Deleuze’s *Essays Critical and Clinical*:

Schizophrenia is an acute phenomenon that poses numerous problems to the clinical method: not only is there no agreement as to the etiology of schizophrenia, but even its symptomatology remains uncertain. In most psychiatric accounts of schizophrenia (Kraepelin, Bleuler), the diagnostic criteria are given in purely *negative* terms, that is, in terms of the destruction the disorder engenders in the subject: dissociation, autism, detachment from reality ... The problem with both psychiatry and psychoanalysis is that these negative symptoms are dispersed and scattered, and are difficult

to totalize or unify in a coherent clinical entity, or even a localizable "mode of existence": "schizophrenia is a discordant syndrome, always in flight from itself". (Embedded quotations from Deleuze, 1972, p. 735)

The symptomatology of poststructuralist geography is therefore an affirmation of schizophrenia *as a process*, rather than that process as it is 'arrested,' 'interrupted,' or 'isolated' in a mode of life. One frequently hears complaints that postmodernism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction are dissociated, autistic, and detached from reality, complaints that betray the inability of those clinicians to become attuned to schizophrenia as process. Becoming. Symptomatology. Schizophrenia. Such are the components of an ethic of the event. One traverses a field of non-totalizable fragments, which affect you or not. The ethical task is to become worthy of one's encounter with these forces of affectation: not to force constancy on them, but to lend them consistency. To let them hold together without wounding their disjointure and their becoming otherwise. (This is how the 'good' book runs alongside its bibliography.) Poststructuralist geography affirms what is still coming. This is the good way of engaging with the geographical tradition, an intensive reading that is open to the differential forces traversing and deforming the field, rendering it otherwise. Engagement is the key word here. Drawing on its mechanical senses, one could say that reading and writing are machinic before they are communicative. What matters is not primarily their 'truth' or 'sense' content (the work reduced to its real-world referents, transcendental signifieds, or master signifiers, for example), but their relations of speed and slowness, their circulation and redistribution of energy, and how they affect and are in turn affected.

Thoughts are not the fruits of the earth. They are not registered by areas, except out of human commodity. Thoughts are clouds. The periphery of thoughts is as immeasurable as the fractal lines of Benoit Mandelbrot. Thoughts are pushed and pulled at variable speeds. They are deep, although core and skin are of the same grain. Thoughts never stop changing their location one with another ... One cloud casts its shadow on another, the shape of clouds varies with the angle from which they are approached. (Lyotard, 1988b, p. 5)

Such an image of thought calls not only for a schizoanalysis, but also for a 'liminal materialism' and a 'libidinal economy' (Doel, 1994a; Lyotard, 1993). "The 'bad' or sickly life is an exhausted and degenerated mode of existence, one that judges life from the perspective of its sickness, that devaluates [*sic*] life in the name of 'higher' values," such as truth, writes Daniel Smith (1997, p. xv). "The 'good' or healthy life, by contrast, is an overflowing and ascending form of existence, a mode of life that is able to transform itself depending on the forces it encounters, always

increasing the power to live, always opening up new possibilities for life."

Streaming. Braiding. Becoming. Schizophrenia. Deterritorialization. This is indeed a beautiful milieu for geographers, engendering remarkable events for those prepared to launch themselves into the flux. Learning to let go, to become alert to difference and differentiation, is the task of critical human geography. An openness to the event of space is the ethic specific to geography. From the off, then, I am declining the traditional ethic of geography: the ethic of place, an ethic especially associated with humanistic currents in geography (see for example Buttimer, 1993; Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977). It is not so much the particularity, nor even the undercurrent of authenticity, that troubles me (everything in *its* place), but rather its adherence to integral formations and pointillism (everything *in* place).

For example, Entrikin (1991, p. 134) concludes his *Betweenness of Place* by suggesting that "The closest we can come to addressing both sides of th[e] divide" between the humanistic-subjective pole of understanding on the one hand (an empathetic and singular knowing-from-the-inside), and the scientific-objective pole of exactitude on the other hand (an affectless and reproducible knowing-from-the-outside), "is from a point in between ... We gain a sense both of being 'in a place' and 'at a location,' of being at the centre and being at a point in a centerless world." *From, in, at*: such a prepositional and sedentary fixation never gets us any closer to recognizing the essential element — that place is an event: it is verbal rather than nounal, a becoming rather than a being. As Revill (1993) demonstrates so wonderfully in his consideration of multi-ethnic life in postcolonial, inner-city Derby, what *takes place* is neither situated nor contained within a particular location, but is instead splayed out and unfolded across a myriad of vectors. In these portraits of Derby, conventionally (mis)placed in the East Midlands region of England, Pakistan, Jamaica, and Bollywood are infinitely closer than its apparently 'nearest neighbours' of Nottingham and Leicester, which, along with London, fold into the darkness (cf. Bhabha, 1993; Chambers, 1994; Massey, 1991). These vectors of disjointure and dislocation may conjugate and reverberate, but there is no necessity for them to converge on a particular experiential or physical location. Such are the mis-meetings consequent upon events sliding past each other in absolute proximity. This is why I emphasize that what takes place *unfolds* and *splays out*, rather than give succour to more sedentary images of thought like fusion, hybridization, or glocalization. Such a recognition is the degree-zero of geography: place is nothing if it is not *in process*. This is not to separate pattern from process or events from process. For the event is itself processive.

Now, Marxist geographers and urbanists have made many of us acutely aware of the processive nature of the social production of place and space (see for example Harvey, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991, 1996; Massey, 1984, 1995; Soja, 1980, 1989a), although it is important to underscore the fact that this processive quality is carried through the realm of meaning no less than that of matter (see for example Olsson, 1991, 1993; Pred, 1983, 1984, 1986; Thrift, 1983). This emphasis on process is in stark contrast to the study of place in terms of character, meaning, awareness or consciousness where it is these latter that are in process and subject to contestation, rather than (the) place itself (see for example Daniels, 1992; Entrikin, 1997; Taylor, forthcoming). The event of place opens onto metamorphosis, polymorphous perversion, and the redistribution of energy. By contrast, the illicit immobilization of such an event to context, setting, milieu, location, etc. opens onto representation, the crisis of representation, and all manner of imaginative geographies. And despite the innumerable points of convergence between the verbal and nomenclature engagements with place, they are nevertheless polarized in terms of speed and slowness. Sedentary thought enforces a difference in kind, whilst nomad thought affirms a mere difference of degree. In keeping with sedentary thought, Tuan (1977, p. 6) tells us that "if we think of space as that which allows movement, then place is pause." Place is rest. Place to place is movement. Space is abstract speed – the speed of abstraction. Or again: "when space feels thoroughly familiar to us, it has become place" (Tuan, 1977, p. 73). For sedentary thought, then, *place* may be open or closed, extroverted or introverted, homogeneous or heterogeneous, homely or eerie, totalized or fragmented, univocal or equivocal – but it is always slower, more earthly, more concrete, more grounded, and more real than space. For *space* lends itself to speed, immateriality, abstractness, floatation, and relational disjuncture. Hence the tendency for many humanistically-inclined geographers to associate the folding back of space onto place with the quashing of authenticity and specificity, and the advent of alienation, placelessness, and non-places – or as Benko (1997, p. 23) puts it: "dequalification, derealization, and virtualization;" "Never before in the history of the world have non-places occupied so much space" (see also Augé, 1995; Gottdiener, 1995; Relph, 1976). In a symptomatic list of those things "responsible for the production of interchangeable places, identical throughout the world, through which people move without stopping," it is *speed* that heads Benko's (1997, p. 24) list (cf. Mugerauer, 1994). Likewise, the disavowal of the speed of place can be seen in Sack's (1997) framework of *thick* and *thin* places. This solidification of place is echoed in Massey's (1978, 1984) stratification of the emergent spatial structure of an economic space in terms of (overdetermined) 'layers of investment.' Such a sedimentary and

sedentary fixation extends into many of the images of thought supporting geography, wherein movement is geared around a moment of rest (e.g. a place for the accumulation of stock or for expanded reproduction); it also lends itself to striation and segmentation (cf. Dixon and Jones, 1996, 1998). Consequently, Harvey (1996) is right to be incredulous towards the absurdity of treating space "as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile," whilst treating time as "richness, fecundity, life, dialectic," as Foucault (1980, p. 70) famously phrased it (cf. Foucault, 1986). But one must also be incredulous about the polarization of place and space, which hinges on the glaciation of events in perpetual process. If it were not such an inelegant neologism, I would be tempted to say that there is nothing but *splace*, taking *splace* – *splacing*. And there would be nothing negative about this: no possibility of a catastrophic or negatory displacement insofar as *splacement* would always already be disjoined, disadjusted, and unhinged; both place and space would be special – illusory? – effects of *splacement*'s inaugural duplicity (cf. Derrida, 1989f; Lacoque-Labarthe, 1989). It is the same with deconstruction and schizoanalysis. Not dis-*splacement*. Just di-*splacement*: the prefix 'di-' signifying the double register in which the *splacement* takes *splace*; or else the prefix 'di-' or 'dis-' signifying the intensification and thoroughgoingness of the *splacement*. As Derrida (1995, p. 28) usefully reminds us in his consideration of the suggestion that Deconstruction is/in America: "'in' can indicate inclusion as well as provisional passage, the being-in-transit of the visitor ... If D is in A, it is not A; if D is A, it is not in, etc. The slash indeed inscribes or incises a disjunction in the copula 'is.'" Such a disjuncture recurs throughout the chapters that follow.

Place is what takes place: "Producing, a product," say Deleuze and Guattari (1984, p. 7) during their machinic introduction to schizoanalysis. By failing to recognize this minimal dislocation, which plays out the nomenclature of place from the off, 'betweenness' is positioned by Entrikin (1991) as a privileged point of view that proffers an experience of both the interiority and exteriority of place. 'Betweenness,' like 'embedding' and 'situatedness,' does nothing to disrupt the partition between what is inside and what is outside. It seeks to occupy the threshold without realizing that what has been put into question is the threshold itself. Nevertheless, there is much to be valued in many of the more nuanced renditions of the ethic of place, such as those of Mugerauer (1994, 1995), and from very a different direction, Thrift's delineation of a 'new regional geography' (1990, 1991, 1993). Even what Massey (1991, 1993) aptly calls 'a progressive sense of place' that is extroverted rather than introverted, networked rather than isolated, bears the trace of pointillism: discreteness and discreteness. Be that as it may, my own concern with space is not dissociated from place. I am

certainly not advocating space in the abstract, but nor am I simply moving towards space as it is lived and practised by human bodies over and against the crushing force of spatial abstractions such as money, clock-time, and calculation (cf. Lefebvre, 1991; Sennett, 1994; Soja, 1989a, 1989b, 1993, 1996). For strictly speaking, place never takes place – here, there or anywhere, least of all *in* time. At best, place *takes* place: and this is why I decline Thrift's (1996b, p. 47) insistence that "being is never out of place," whilst agreeing with him that "all space is practised." Were being to be 'em-placed' or 'contextualized,' as he suggests, then it would simply be unbecoming. And as Thrift (1996b, p. 1) headlines in the title to his introductory essay in *Spatial Formations*, what is at stake here is the 'style' of non-representational theory.

The event of place (is what) deconstructs (cf. Strohmayr, 1998). Hereinafter, there are only events of spacing. Geography is spaced out and splayed out (cf. Strohmayr, 1997a). Hence my decision to parenthesize splay – (s)play: the disjunctive synthesis of play and splay, remarked by the disjointure of the disseminating letter *par excellence*, 's,' and underscored by the incision of the unity of the word by the parentheses themselves as marks of an irreducible interlude or interval in the event itself, and not merely around it. An event is (s)played out: the interval takes all. In what follows I will have occasion to employ some other parenthesized neologisms in order that the text might resonate in several registers at once, and I hope that they do not adversely affect your reading pleasure.

Letting space take place: that is the ambition of geography, when it is radical. For myself, then, geography is simply an inclination towards the event of spacing. This is not spacing in the paranoiac sense of dissociating one position from another, of forcing distanciated identities onto space – a tendency that I have dubbed 'pointillism.' Rather than there being a poststructuralism that could get taken up by geography and geographers, I want to demonstrate that poststructuralism is always already spatial: that it attends from the off to the 'difference that space makes.' It is the event of space, of spacing, that deconstructs. Speaking always as geographers, poststructuralists strain to become sensitive to what it is to space – to what happens when space takes place. Shamefully, spatial scientists steeped in the geographical tradition know very little about what it is to space and to take place. Contrary to popular opinion, neither space nor place are given, least of all as ready-mades or loci of authenticity. Rather, they must be lent consistency: a task that is both contextual and inexhaustible. Hitherto, the spaces and places within which geographers have worked have been ill-mannered and unbecoming. Quite simply, they have invariably lacked consistency, owing in large measure to the predilection for pointillism in geography. In the nick of time, poststructuralism may come to lend relief. Why? It is

because poststructuralism affirms the fact that there are no points of constancy in this or any other universe. There are just folds of consistency – and nothing more. Everything is manifold. Even points vibrate.

By turning towards poststructuralism I will therefore be opening and affirming what is always already in play within geography, and not merely around it. If the reader can be dragged away from the negatory myths that have tended to envelop and deaden the joyful force and insatiable passion of poststructuralism, then something both remarkable and important may come into view. New geography may once again become possible. For when all is said and done, geography, like any other activity, has nothing whatsoever to do with representation, least of all the so-called 'crisis' of representation. Geography is an act, an event, a happening. It is evaluated not according to its degree of correspondence, coherence, or integrity, but according to how it affects and is affected by other events. Far from being idealist, textualist or nihilistic, poststructuralism affirms an immanent expression of the material forces lending consistency to an event. It affirms the differential and manifold spacing according to which the event goes off (cf. Barthes, 1984). The ethical and political question therefore becomes what to do with this excess, which, to borrow a phrase from Bataille (1988), could justifiably be called the 'accursed share.' Such excess goes by many names – including difference, alterity, heterogeneity, otherness, contradiction, complementarity, impossibility, and undecidability. For the time being, however, I will dwell on chaos – if only to shake things up before they have the chance of settling into place. Cast of the die

Flow

Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p. 42)

fluidifying solidified thinking (Malabou, 1996, p. 117)

Chaos can be (un)folded in many ways. So let me admit it right from the off: there is no possibility of resolution or climax; there is no chance of escaping from the interminable foreplay that is coming; and there is no holding formation that can contain and solidify the whirling vapour that is the world. There is nothing beyond the event horizon of chaos-mosis (Guattari, 1992). Consequently, what I long for are concepts that express this infinitely disadjusted chaos. "I would like to plead that if I am unable to take a position," says Lyotard (1988b, p. 5), "this is due not to a bent toward confusion – at least I hope not – but to the lightness of thoughts" (cf. Derrida, 1981a). Going against the grain of common

sense and good sense, I want to assemble utterly *chaotic abstractions* – but only on condition that such abstractions do not take thought-and-action away from the chaos (for there is no other), only away from the apparent concretions that dissimulate and disavow the chaos.

For me, there is nothing outside the chaosmos. However, that does not mean that the chaosmos is unified, totalized, or complete. It is infinitely disadjusted, differentiated, and disjoined. Without origin or end, the chaosmos only has a middle, a milieu, a meantime, in which it is (s)played out. One cannot know in advance how the folds will pan out and snap shut. Yet in the swirling that envelops me, like a thick fog, I can sense innumerable shape-shifters starting to stir. Through a certain immanent rhythm in any particular milieu these shape-shifters may take on some recognizable form – a concept, an idea, a person, a thing, a place, a time, etc. – , but they invariably strike me as being insubstantial and immaterial, shimmering on the surface of the particulate mass that is forever in circulation. Through some sort of animism or sorcery, or perhaps through fortuity and happenstance alone, something seems to coalesce amidst the vapour clouds: a 'something-or-other = *x*' takes (the) place (of indiscernibility). Whatever it is, it strikes me that it is only ever a special effect of relations of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, of lighting and texture, and of rhythm and consistency. No thing is there: just effects of differential spacing. One's world is suspended in milieus of chaos, whilst a certain differential and web-like texturing lends 'something-or-other = *x*' a limited consistency – but always from a particular point of view. Yet unlike a spider's web, which orders and regulates a block of space-time as an apparatus of capture, there can be no chaosmotic web-master. If a web is an archetypal network, which endures through connection, capture, filtering, channelling, and extension, then the chaosmos exemplifies the unrelenting scission of irrational cuts and folds. Fortunately, however, each of us has our own way of living with the chaosmos, of conjuring some recognizable forms and discernible things on the screen of a swirling mass, and of dissolving others into the vaporous body that engulfs us.

So: chaos amid chaos. Folds amidst folds. That is all I ever really wanted to say. Rather than write a book, it might therefore have been better to have constructed a quasi-Rorschach test: cast your eyes up from this page, and when you gaze into the chaosmos, what do you see? Or the other way: can you look at some region of the chaosmos *without* seeing some integral things? And if I were to be reckless enough to risk an ambition for this book, then it might be to enable one to glimpse the indiscernible chaosmos *in* the place of everything that seems so effortlessly to hold together, rather than merely *around* it. For the free-form, or metamorphic perversity, of the infinitely (un)folded chaosmos does not subsist in the interstices between discernible forms

and given things, it supersaturates every pore of their becoming-only-to-fade. To lose one's suspension of disbelief with regard to forms, things, places, times, events – and even with regard to numbers: integers and fractions, real and imaginary numbers, etc. If this sounds like a crazy, futile, dangerous, and pointless exercise, which has nothing whatsoever to do with geography, then that is unfortunate (cf. Morris, 1996). For me, the irresistible force of poststructuralism is precisely that it is pointless – literally. It promises the possibility of a geographical thought-and-practice that does not revolve around *points*. And anyone familiar with the difficulties, aporias, and paradoxes of conventional forms of *pointillism* in geography should take that promise seriously.

In geography and urban studies, there is much talk of a deterritorializing and increasingly borderless 'world of flows' – of capital, commodities, information, taste, culture, value, etc. Were it the case, such fluidity may or may not signal a new epoch in the historical geography of capitalism, with a qualitative shift from, say, industrial to postindustrial society or modernity to postmodernity (cf. Bell, 1973; Castells, 1996, 1997; Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1984). Likewise, it remains unclear whether or not the rising permeability of established social, cultural, economic, and political boundaries will render state apparatuses of governance increasingly ineffectual, at whatever resolution: local, regional, national, international, global, universal (see for example Taylor, 1994, 1995). One should recall, with Deleuze and Guattari (1988), that deterritorialization is always coupled to a correlative reterritorialization. For example, the deterritorialized earth reinscribed on the body of the despot; the deterritorialized body of the despot reinscribed on the inorganic body of capital; the deterritorialized body of capital reinscribed on the incorporeal body of the code; the deterritorialized body of the code reinscribed on universal schizophrenia. In addition, the 'world of flows' lends itself to a reconsideration of the asymptotic annihilation of space through time, which has caught the imagination of writers from the mass uptake of the bicycle in nineteenth-century Europe – as an expression of the first major instalment in the democratization of speed – to the routinization of satellite communication on the eve of the twenty-first century (Thrift, 1994, 1996a; Wark, 1994). But it is not just the disappearance of the drag of space that is up for consideration, since there is also the matter of the extermination of time through real-time – the virtual-cum-actual realization and exhaustion of the world's possibilities in the present (cf. Baudrillard, 1995, 1996b; Doel and Clarke, 1998b; Virilio, 1994).

For all of the hyperbole surrounding the 'end of geography' and the emergence of a 'perpetual present,' space-time continues to drag. Indeed, the friction of distanciation is felt even in the control nodes of what Thrift (1995, 1997) aptly refers to as the 'hyperactive world' of 'soft

capitalism.' Such friction affects the bodies of the cleaners, caterers, and security staff, no less than those of the foreign-exchange dealers and traders (Allen and Pryke, 1994). It is never simply a matter of *speed* – of time-space convergence, acceleration, and compression (Harvey, 1989, 1996; Leyshon, 1995) – but of *speed and slowness*. There can be no acceleration without a parallel deceleration, no convergence without divergence, and no compression without decompression. For ours is a scrumpled universe of general relativity (Doel, 1996). This is why I applaud Lefebvre's (1991, p. 416) insistence that "nothing and no one can avoid *trial by space*," whilst remaining sceptical about his anthropocentric yearning for the human body to be disclosed as the proper measure of space: "the yardstick of space – or, more precisely, the yardstick of spatial practice" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 54). It is on the basis of this anthropocentrism that Lefebvre discerns an ongoing historical and geographical conflict between *lived space* and *abstract space* (cf. Blum and Nast, 1996). Lived space belongs to the flesh, to spatial practices, bodily gestures, and sensuous activity. Here, "space ... still held up to all members of society an image and a living reflection of their own bodies" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 111). By contrast, abstract space is conceived before it is lived. It may appear to serve "those forces which make a *tabula rasa* of whatever stands in their way ... with space performing the function of a plane, a bulldozer or a tank," says Lefebvre. But it "is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its 'lens'" (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 285 and 287, respectively). Abstract space is the enemy of the fully sensuous and organic body. Its objectivation and decorporealization work to dequalify social space, shifting it from an *analogical* to a *metaphorical* register (Gregory, 1994a, 1997; cf. Sennett, 1994). The space that was once isomorphic with the comportment and habits of bodies has given way to a space composed according to the disembodied logic and cold calculation of signs and symbols. Exemplified in the Phallus, Logos, number, geometry, and capital, abstract space strives to dissociate itself from the practices, rhythms, and textures of the body. The contradictions of this disavowal necessitates the dialectical promise of a sublime *differential space* that will restore the body as the proper yardstick of a reappropriated social space: "The body, at the very heart of space and of the discourse of power, is irreducible and subversive. It is the body which is the point of return" (Lefebvre, 1976, p. 89). Or again: "the body takes its revenge – or at least calls for revenge. It seeks to make itself known – to gain recognition – as *generative*. (Of what? Of practice, of use, hence of space – and, by extension, of the human species)" (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 384).

Despite my scepticism with regard to his humanism, what I love about Lefebvre's analysis is that he does not simply oppose lived space and abstract space. Rather, abstract space is a certain folding of lived

space. It is lived space folded back on itself, not in order to affirm life (what Lefebvre refers to as 'appropriation' and 'reappropriation'), but in order to crush it (what he refers to as 'domination'). "The shift, which is so hard to grasp, from the space of the body to the body-in-space ... somehow facilitates the spiriting-away or scotomization of the body. How did this magic ever become possible?" asks Lefebvre (1991, p. 201). He answers by reference to 'splits,' 'interstices,' and 'intervals' that open up a zone into which something might slip and thereby dislocate itself. Nevertheless, Lefebvre overlooks the fact that lived space *puts itself out of joint* in order to lay the blame squarely on that which slips *into* these lesions in the Order of Things.

Folding, unfolding, refolding. Such is the schizoanalytic potential of Lefebvre's rhythmanalysis. What holds him back? What prevents him from seeing that the scission goes all the way down? The unbecoming illusion of a full body that precedes such a split, an illusion that Derrida (1994b) deconstructs in relation to Marx's spooky story about the fetishism of commodities, and that Lyotard (1993) deconstructs in relation to Marx's prosecution of the inorganic and fragmented body of capital.

In some circumstances a split occurs, and an interstice or interval is created – a very specific space which is at once magical and real ... But what is it exactly that slips into the interstice in question? The answer is: language, signs, abstractions – all necessary yet fateful, indispensable yet dangerous. This is a lethal zone thickly strewn with dusty, mouldering words. What slips into it is what allows meaning to escape the embrace of lived experience, to detach itself from the fleshy body. (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 202–3)

If neither place nor the body can serve as an origin or yardstick for an appropriate(d) social space, this is because they are always already given over to the (s)play of polymorphous perversion. However, whether there is anything impervious to the force of polymorphous perversion remains a moot point.

Interruption

If things aren't going well in contemporary thought, it's because ... analysis in terms of movement or vectors is blocked. (Deleuze, 1992a, p. 281)

Having briefly let myself get swept up by place, the body, and what slips between a body and its space, I now want to hold on for a moment to the motif of a 'world of flows.' Such a motif pervades much of contemporary human geography and urban studies. Surely it is self evident that these flows invariably turn out to be composed of some solid or particulate mass. One need only think of the flows of resources,

commodities, capital, and people. As for immaterial flows of number, information, discourse, and money, these are always inseparable from their material supports: infrastructures, phenomenal forms, epistemic communities, actor-networks, etc. (see, for example: Barnes, 1998). Additionally, it should be self-evident that all such flows are never free-flowing: they are directed, channelled, organized, and stockpiled, usually with obvious sources and sink-holes. In short, there can be no fluidity without ground and solidity: no streaming without banks or bed, gravitational mass or slope. And were there to be no such ground or solidity, there would still need to be flow against flow, such that one flow would reterritorialize another flow as its 'baseless ground' or border. There are only relative deterritorializations – even when they are run to infinity. Absolute deterritorialization is always relative. More modestly, even the hyperactive web-masters of the world of soft capitalism, ensconced in the corporate citadels of London, New York, and Tokyo, require their endo- and exoskeletons, their infra- and superstructures. The upshot of this example is simply that the image of a vaporous world of utter chaos is illusory. It is self-evident that innumerable entities are more or less insoluble, whilst others actively resist and marshal liquescence in order to enhance, precisely, their stability and solidity. Things endure.

Harvey (1996, pp. 7–8) puts it beautifully: "While I accept the general argument that process, flux, and flow should be given a certain ontological priority in understanding the world, I also want to insist that this is precisely the reason why we should pay so much more careful attention to ... the 'permanences' that surround us and which we also construct to help solidify and give meaning to our lives." Specifically, 'permanence' (causal structure) amounts to "relatively stable configurations of matter and things," which are 'practically indestructible' (Harvey, 1996, pp. 51 and 50, respectively). It is at this juncture that I depart from Harvey's image of thought. The emphasis on permanency and indestructibility seems to me to occlude the regulation of fluids that is the condition of possibility of rigidity and turgidity, an occlusion that resurfaces in the slippage between "how 'things' crystallize out of processes" and how permanences 'successfully internalize' flows (Harvey, 1996, p. 81). Ontology has always been figured on the basis of sexual difference, especially in terms of Phallus and Logos – that which is given to standing against the flow (Derrida, 1995b; Krell, 1997). Yet there is no Phallus that is not worked over by fluidity, that is not lent turgidity through a certain constriction of fluidity, just as there is no Logos that is not worked over by variation and dissemination. Hence my incredulity towards Harvey's insistence on the necessity for a certain phallogocentric fixation, specifically on the world-wide trial by capital. (The formula 'phallus plus Logos' is perhaps no better expressed than

by capital, a would-be transcendental signifier whose current degree of flotation draws everything into its own calculus of difference.) This is what he says:

While it is formally true that everything can be reduced to flows ... we are in daily practice surrounded by things, institutions, discourses, and even states of mind of such relative permanence and power that it would be foolish not to acknowledge those evident qualities. There is, I believe, little point in asserting some sort of 'dissolution of all fixity and permanence' in the famous 'last instance' if, as far as we human beings are concerned, that last instance is nowhere in sight. The 'solid rock' of historical-geographical materialism ... (Harvey, 1996, p. 8)

My incredulity is sparked by a threefold qualification of Harvey's opening image of thought concerning ontological fluxion. First, it is not a question of 'reducing' something afluvial to flows. One does not have some afluvial substance, which may or may not be dissolvable, on the one side, and some dissolving or corroding fluids on the other, any more than one has a material World over there and an ideal Language over here, or a firm masculinity and a soft femininity. If there is something, then it is only ever as a confluence, interruption, and coagulation of flows. Second, and as a consequence, there is no 'last instance' of ultimate dissolution, wherein permanency and solidity would finally give way to a pure flux. Nor is there any 'first instance' or 'meantime' of (relative) permanence and solidity. There is just a general relativity of flows – with all of the relations of speed and slowness, movement and rest, etc. In this regard it is odd that Harvey (1996, p. 93) should take "The famous 'last instance' of the material practice of production and reproduction ... as both the *starting point* and the *measuring point* of achievement," when he rejects out of hand the infamous 'last instance' of the 'dissolution of all fixity and permanence.' Moreover, the consistency and viscosity of some degree of 'fluidity' and 'solidity' not only depend upon a certain milieu, but also on a certain point of view. On occasion, Harvey seems to equate fluidity in a free state with the microscopic, such as the wave-like flux of atomic particles amidst the solidity of some material substance. But this is to occlude the fact that even a densely-structured macroscopic portion of matter is traversed by innumerable movements. Finally, and most importantly, it is not that solidity can be set off against fluidity, or microscopic fluxion from macroscopic coagula, but that they are all the special effects of folding. Vapoury and fluidity can neither be opposed to, nor separated from, solidity, except through relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness, turgidity and flaccidity, and rhythm and consistency. Permanence is a special effect of fluidics. Harvey seems to repeatedly acknowledge such a state of affairs. For example, capital is capital only

insofar as it is in a *certain kind of motion*. And if capital petrifies it is because of the regularity of its orbit and the monotony of its immutable motility. One cannot overcome the sickly affects of 'permanency' by creating another kind of permanency, as Harvey insists is the case. Rather, one can only overcome such a blockage in polymorphous perversion by effecting *another kind of motion*: from restricted to general mobility. Hereinafter, resistance is no longer opposed to power, as one solid construct facing-off another. It just unfolds and refolds. Resistance does not come from outside: it is literally an action re(s)play – a difference-producing repetition. Accordingly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) do not oppose the speed and mobility of capital to the integrity of the labouring body. They do not oppose a fast, inorganic, and vampiric body against the slow creatures that we humans are. To the contrary, they push for absolute deterritorialization – for the re-release of polymorphous perversion.

Accordingly, while I would agree that relational "Dialectics forces us always to ask the question of every 'thing' or event that we encounter: by what process was it constituted and how is it sustained?" (Harvey, 1996, p. 50), one will not arrive at an answer that is not worked over by disjointure and other *écoutes*. This is why I prefer Deleuze's (1993b) notion of origami: the world can be (un)folded in countless ways, with innumerable folds over folds, and folds within folds, but such a disfiguration never permits one (or more) of those folds to become redundant, nor for one (or more) of them to seize power as a master-fold. Every fold plays its part in lending consistency to the thing that is folded, and since every fold participates in the lending of consistency to 'something = x' without ever belonging to it (hence the empiricist principle of the irreducible externality of relations to their relata), folds cannot be distinguished in terms of the essential and the inessential, the necessary and the contingent, or the structural and the ornamental. Every fold plays its part: every fold splays 'it' apart. The event of origami is in the (un)fold, just as the gift is in the wrapping: not as content, but as process.

Despite the almost absolute proximity of Harvey's text and my own, there is something ambivalent in his milieu that is forever falling back on the process in order to arrest it. Three prominent motifs are symptomatic of this attempt to block a return of the repressed: *permanence*, *integration*, and *embedment*. They are invoked at moments of difficulty in order to constrain the disarranging force of the chaomotic excess of undetermined and unformed matter in a free state. Harvey does not wish to let himself go with the flow. "We all know what Heraclitus meant when he said that we cannot step into the same river twice," notes Harvey (1996, p. 61); "but we also know that there is a sense in which we can return again and again to the banks of the same river."

This serves as a suitable refrain for the whole of Harvey's book. On the one hand, *flow* is given a 'certain' ontological priority: the scare quotes suggesting that this certainty is somewhat uncertain, an ambivalence that is partly unfolded by Natter and Jones (1997). This is simply because every 'thing,' 'event,' 'moment,' 'system,' 'element,' etc., is perpetually *in process* for the duration of its existence: nothing can endure without a life-giving flow from the 'outside' to sustain its turgidity (the life of the fleshy human body, no less than the non-organic life of vampiric capital). On this basis Harvey (1996, p. 54) tells us "that change and instability are the norm and that the appearance of stability of 'things' or systems is what has to be explained." On the other hand, these enduring 'permanences' – as Harvey is fond of calling them – that 'crystallize' out of the flux are given a certain ontological – and ethico-political – priority (the absence of scare quotes suggesting that this is indeed certain). Harvey can be so certain because permanences stratify, constrict, and regulate the flows; an inhibition that can *only* be overcome through the creation of other permanences – permanences that ready the given constriction for a 'dissolution into a flow,' for a release of other possibilities. Yet as Marx noted in relation to the crystallization of value in commodities, such a solidification is both retroflex (untimely) and virtual (incorporeal): a certain calculus of exteriorized, differential relations *falls back on* the surface of bodies, lending them a certain form, consistency, and duration qua body. Value, form, consistency, duration, etc. are all special effects of the (s)play of differential relations.

If (relative) permanence and crystallization fail to block a return of the repressed, perhaps 'embedment' can – a term that appears to play a role akin to superglue: as a universal bonding agent. Embedment secures events into place, and space (and time) into place. It is also called upon to secure the bond between theory and world, and to concretize abstractions into the quotidian. "Theory cannot be brought to bear upon the world of daily political practices without finding ways to embed in it the materialities of place, space, and environment," insists Harvey (1996, pp. 44–5). This presupposes a separation between theory and world, language/discourse and reality, a separation underscored in the claim that "If spatiality disrupts received theory and dominant metanarratives ..." (Harvey, 1996, p. 9). What Harvey challenges, then, is not the gulf between the world and language, but how that gulf is to be bridged: ineffectual 'spatial metaphors' or effective 'material embedment'? In fact, he seeks to *entrench* the expulsion of theory, discourse, and language from the world of lived materiality, as the schematic 'moments' of his 'Cognitive Map of the Social Process' makes plain.

I am here reducing a vast array of activities to six fundamental moments of social life. The social process ... flows in, through and around all of

these moments and the activities of each and every individual embrace all of the moments simultaneously ... Each moment is constituted as an *internal relation* of the others within the flow of social and material life. Discourses internalize in some sense everything that occurs at other moments (thus giving credence to Derrida's foundational statement that 'there is nothing outside of the text' or Foucault's foundational view that discourse is power) ... Errors arise when examination of one 'moment' is held sufficient to understand the totality of the social process. Again and again we will find slippages of the sort that convert a dialectically correct statement like "there is nothing outside of the text" into false statements that "everything can be understood through texts" (or, worse still, "everything is a text and can be understood as such") ... Internal relations are shaped through an activity of *translation* from one moment to another ... A gap always exists between the different moments so that slippage, ambiguity and unintended consequences inevitably occur. (Harvey, 1996, pp. 79–80)

In this dense passage Harvey is very close to poststructuralism, as can be seen by his insistence on the irreducibility of material translation, slippage, ambiguity, adestation, etc. Nevertheless, the passage still maintains an unblemished distinction between what is *inside* – a 'moment' of pure 'activity,' such as 'power,' 'material practice,' 'discourse,' or 'desire' – and what is *outside* – other moments irreducible to the first. What shatters the 'Leibnizian conceit' of *turning inwards* in the belief that one can thereby recover the whole is the fact that the internalization of the One-All process into each and every moment is an imperfect translation: there is always some residue, which Harvey, quite rightly, calls "metamorphosis" – "each moment internalizes forces from all of the others" (Harvey, 1996, p. 80). And it is amidst the flows *between* 'moments' that 'things,' 'elements,' 'domains,' and 'systems' "crystallize out" (Harvey, 1996, p. 81). But crucially for Harvey (1996, p. 106), the metamorphic excess that moves, deforms, and transforms bodies is not located "*outside of* the overall flow of determination within social relations." He rightly eschews the romanticization and essentialization of the 'margin.' Yet by disavowing the force of the outside the patchwork of moments and permanences swells up to fill the whole field. Its logic of internalization permits of no outside. This is the dialectical ruse *par excellence* – internalization becomes totalization. One could be easily seduced by Harvey's *openness* to other *écoutes*, were it not for this eating disorder, this insatiable compulsion to internalize. "Misconstrued, treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its historical domination, finally unfolding its immense enveloping resources without obstacle. Hegelian self-evidence seems lighter than ever at the moment when it finally bears down with its full weight" (Derrida, 1978, p. 251). And it is

precisely at such a moment of sublime lightness that Harvey's 'permanences' take on their infinite density: "Because of the contradictions," he says – contradictions that are strictly *internal affairs*, wrought by the *pressure* and *force* of internalization – "there are innumerable leverage points *within* the system that can be seized upon by dissident groups or individuals to try to redirect social change down this or that path" (Harvey, 1996, p. 106). Revolutionary currents and their suppression are, then, strictly internal affairs, as a Minister of the Interior might say. The 'weak links' recognize no outside agency, since the outside *is* the inside. Little wonder, then, that Harvey (1996, p. 71) should be so damning of Derrida's attempt at "rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us" (quoted in Spivak, 1988, p. 294). In his text for Blanchot, *The Thought from Outside*, Foucault (1990, pp. 27–8) puts it superbly:

To be attracted is not to be beckoned by the allure of the outside; rather, it is to experience in emptiness and destitution the presence of the outside and, tied to that presence, the fact that one is irremediably outside the outside. Far from calling on one interiority to draw close to another, attraction makes it imperiously manifest that the outside is there, open, without intimacy, without protection or retention ..., but that one cannot gain access to that opening because the outside never yields its essence. The outside cannot offer itself as a positive presence – as something inwardly illuminated by the certainty of its own existence – but only as an absence that pulls as far away from itself as possible, receding into the sign it makes to draw one toward it.

Such is the driftwork that carries one from *production* – embedment, internalization, crystallization, and permanence – , towards *seduction* (cf. Baudrillard, 1990a).

So, one can applaud the implication that each translation or metamorphosis has nothing whatsoever to do with representation: there is simply a redistribution of energy and affects. However, the boundary maintenance between one moment and another does not hold, since the internal milieu of each is not given in advance of the differential relations that inscribe it as an effect of the play of folding that traverses, halves together, and disjoins the inside–outside in one and the same duplicitous operation. Once one recognizes this, the trifid mapping of '*flom*' (with its un/certain priority), '*moment*' (the locus where the One-All is internalized through an imperfect translation and material transformation), and '*permanence*' (as an enduring causal structure crystallized between the various moments) deconstructs. One can no longer decide where things fall (apart). So, the topology of the 'windowless world' in which the One-All is traversed by a singularity without totalization is more like a Möbius band than a map – the (s)playing out of differential

relations engenders an invaginating torque that turns the inside out and the outside in. In sum, embedment does not hold. So while it is good that Harvey insists on the perpetual 'heterogeneity' of things, that they can be endlessly decomposed into smaller and smaller packets of heterogeneity, he fails to acknowledge the most radical gesture – that relations traverse and deconstruct both the inside and the outside. To speak of 'internal relations' and 'internalization,' no matter how heterogeneous, is to miss the deconstructive force of differential spacing. I will return to this force throughout the chapters that follow.

It is both ironic and deeply symptomatic of his difficulties that Harvey should so badly misconstrue the work of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, insofar as their entire project is not to transport (embed) matter into concepts – and still less to quarantine themselves in a 'windowless world' of sheer idealism (to embed themselves in the discursive moment alone, for example, refusing internal relations with other such moments) – but to affirm the *materiality* of language, thought, signs, etc. Strictly speaking, there is nothing 'merely metaphorical' about the spatialization of signs. When Harvey (1996, p. 92) writes that Derrida argues "(correctly, in my view) that the text internalizes all," he could not be further from the case. After Hegel, the dialectical machinations strive to internalize all. Derrida, by contrast, deconstructs not only internalization, but also the distinction between inside and outside upon which it rests. What Harvey forgets is that everything is always already spatialized. Without it, nothing would take place. Consider Harvey's (1996, p. 57) eleventh and final proposition on the principles of dialectics: "It is ... always an embedded search for possibilities that lies at the very heart of dialectical argumentation." In laying dialectics to rest so that he might arrive at at least one certainty, Harvey invokes the figure of *embedment* – a figure that is gaining almost universal currency amongst those who think that it resolves the tension between the universal and the particular, space and place, the global and the local, text and context, outside and inside, flow and permanence, etc. Sadly, embedment is counterfeit money. In fixing on embedment Harvey makes crystal clear what others try to let slip between the sheets: that to embed is to fix firmly in a surrounding mass and to surround so as to fix firmly (cf. Entrikin, 1991, on 'situatedness,' 'betweenness,' and 'emplotment'). Recall that moment when he writes that "while I accept the general argument that process, flux, and flow should be given a certain ontological priority in understanding the world" – note the general and uncertain qualifiers – "I also want to insist that this is precisely the reason why we should pay so much more careful attention to what I will later call the 'permanences' that surround us and which we also construct to help solidify and give meaning to our lives" (Harvey, 1996, pp. 7–8). On the basis of his more or less certain acceptance of flux as

pivotal to a logic of internal relations, Harvey absolutely insists – that is to say, without qualification – on the need for the "solid rock" of historical-geographical materialism." From an original moment of privilege, the "dissolution of all fixity and permanence" becomes not only the "famous 'last instance,'" but one that "is nowhere in sight" (Harvey, 1996, p. 8). The judgement is swift: although there are "certain truths" that we need not go into, "those who reject" the 'solid rocks' – and here Harvey is thinking of "Marx's political commitment and the notion of class agency" – "in effect turn their backs on" all kinds of horrors "and become complicitous as historical agents with the reproduction of the particular set of permanences that capitalism has tightly fashioned out of otherwise open, fluid, and dynamic social processes" (Harvey, 1996, p. 108). In the last instance, then, Harvey wants to be first in affirming flux, but one can only affirm it by endlessly deferring it. One must attend to the permanences – first, and last, and always. I am not so certain for the reasons outlined above and because of what is still to come.

These notions of flow and interruption bring me back to Harvey's (1996, p. 61) suggestion that "We all know what Heraclitus meant when he said that we cannot step into the same river twice, but we also know that there is a sense in which we can return again and again to the banks of the same river." What holds for Harvey is precisely that which borders on the flux, hemming it in, constricting it, and inhibiting its current. Like all good 'permanences' that are made from solid rock or pressurized flows, one can return to them over and over again: capital, Logos, Phallus. Although embedded in change – or rather: precisely because of their embedment – they resist change. They are the condition for the return of the same and the condition of impossibility for the return of difference. This is why one must attend to solidity in the name of fluidity, and why one must work for change through the creation of other permanences. In this schema, flows are passive: it is they that are internalized in moments and embedments; and it is between internalizations that permanences crystallize out. I am not so certain. Whereas Harvey affirms through negation – the dialectical trait *par excellence* – I would rather affirm affirmation: flow against flow, flow interrupting flow, that is all. I am never able to return again and again to the banks of the same river. I know only differential repetition, of difference-producing repetitions. For the banks themselves vary in relation to the flows, not least becomes it is always already and everywhere flows that border against flows. Resistance is a matter of flow, not solidity. This is why I cannot plug myself in. I cannot locate the border, the limit, the event horizon, or the running order, that would allow me to embed this book in a place, a time, a discourse, a practice, a theory, a discipline, etc. Such is "a stream without beginning or end, gnawing

away at its two banks and picking up speed in the middle" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, p. 58).

Accordingly, I think that Harvey is wrong to tarnish the Deleuzian art of folding with what he refers to as the 'Liebnizian conceit.' This is the conceit of a windowless monad who believes that s/he internalizes everything, such that to "understand the universe" one need only, *can only*, "contemplate [one's] own inner self" (Harvey, 1996, p. 70). Moreover, it is not so much the world of internal relations that troubles Harvey, it is monadic entities understood as permanences – seamless points – rather than "as continuous transformations and internalizations of different 'moments' (events, things, entities)" (Harvey, 1996, p. 74). Rather than look for *the* moment, one should look for *a* moment *in process* – a moment that is in the process of internalizing an outside. (Such is the digestive philosophy of dialectical materialism.) Yet this is to forget that for Deleuze, the windowless chaosmos of the infinitely (un)folded fold does not close in on itself to form a secure interior – in the manner of a homely living room or an asylum cell. To the contrary, it is seamless only to the extent that a fold can be opened *up* to (an experience of) infinity. Running betwixt and between the four-dimensional universe of solid ground, land masses, fluvia, people, things, etc., is a supplementary universe of *n* dimensions: the seamless fold that is taken to infinity. This is why in the chapters that follow I have sought neither to dissolve, nor to crystallize, nor to embed, nor to solidify. I have sought only to lend a little chaotic consistency to the infinite (s)play of the fold. Programmatically, this has amounted to: *opening up* a certain poststructuralist experience of space and spacing; *opening up* a certain take on geography and geographers; and *opening up* the fold in and of its (differential) self. For the sake of convenience, I have labelled this threefold programme thus: the first opening, *The space of poststructuralism*, which cuts a perverse dash through some of the work of Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, and Lyotard; the second opening, *Schizoanalysis of the geographical tradition*, which seeks to unhinge and (s)play out a number of attempts to constrict geography to various pointillistic configurations of thought-and-action; and the third opening, *Poststructuralist geography*, which sets out a certain rhythm and chor(e)ography for deconstruction, nomadology, rhizomatics, and schizoanalysis. If it is not (s)played out to your liking, then take comfort from the fact that the book can be folded, unfolded, and refolded in many ways. Such is the world.

Part I

The space of poststructuralism

The figure is never *one*.

Jacques Derrida, 'Introduction' to *Typography*

It's a question of dissimilating the givens.

Jean-François Lyotard, *Duchamp's TRANS/formers*

There's nothing more unsettling than the continual movement of something that seems fixed.

Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*