

THEORIES OF STATE FORMATION

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This essay gives a summary and highly selective account of the most significant sociological perspectives on the early and intermediate phases of what one may call statualization - a set of processes taking place in Western Europe between the 12th and the 18th century, in the course of which the practice of rule, as concerned a diminishing number of generally larger and more clearly delimited territories, became to a growing extent:

- depersonalized. That is, rule is (in principle) vested in offices rather than in physical individuals as such;
- formalized. The practice of rule increasingly refers to norms which expressly authorize it, mandate it, and control it;
- integrated. Rule increasingly takes into account other aspects of the social process, recognizes their significance and makes some contribution to their persistence, while being at the same time
- differentiated from them. Rule, that is, addresses distinctive concerns and employs special resources (material and symbolic). Finally, it is
- organized. This expression suggests two related and at the same time contrasting phenomena: on the one hand, rule is exercised by and through a plurality of subjects (individual and collective), on the other these subjects constitute together a single unit, which overrides their plurality.

Why deal with these matters?

As recently as thirty years ago, a work such as this one would probably not have contained an essay devoted to our present topic. At the time, political sociology largely left political institutions to political science. The latter, in turn, showed little concern with 'the state' as such, much less with the question of how it had developed. Subsequently, it fell largely to sociologists (though some of these were active both in sociology and in political science) to 'bring the state back in' (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (eds) 1985). Some of them expressly thematized where, when, how, why the state had come into being and become the key political institution of modernity.

The state was put on the agenda, from the 60's on, by diverse developments. Some of these were of a pragmatic nature: for instance, the feeling that in the West the 'long boom'

and the prevalence of social peace owed much to various forms of public intervention in and regulation of economic and social processes, which shifted and sometimes seemed to erase the state / society divide. On the radical side, some authors emphasised the role played by the welfare state in moderating social conflicts, while others wondered about how long it could continue to play that role.

There were also more specifically intellectual reasons for thematizing the state and its developments. In particular, for reasons not be discussed here, the nature of modernity and the peculiarity of the West began to exercise the minds of some sociologists, and both these overlapping topics necessarily led to an increased awareness of how distinctive and significant Western political arrangements had been, from the Middle Ages on.

Much of the resultant work was inspired by a new appreciation of the theoretical legacy of Max Weber, emphasising his own concern with juridical and political developments. Oddly enough, however, scholars who appealed chiefly, instead, to Marx's legacy, also moved toward the same themes, in spite of the fact that previously the Marxist tradition had de-emphasised them. In the intellectual climate of the social sciences in the 70's, marked by a hegemony of Marxism, in some form or other, much of what went under the name of 'state theory' was in fact a more or less sophisticated exercise in advanced marxology, bent upon the peculiar task, say, of 'deriving the category of the state' from the concept of capital, or of commodity. (Holloway and Picciotto (eds) 1978; Jessop 1982). But some Marx-inspired authors engaged in a less venturesome, more substantial inquiry into the phases and modalities of the development of the modern state. Even today some of the more significant contributions to these topics come from authors who appeal to some extent, more or less expressly, to the Marxist tradition. (Block 1987),

More recent impulses have come, on the one hand, from the growing significance of such concepts / phenomena as nationalism, citizenship, or the public sphere; on the other, from the increasingly problematical nature of the relationship between 'state (or: politics) and markets'. The accounts of state development chosen for attention below emphasise in turn what one may call the managerial, the military, and the economic aspects of 'the state's story'.

The managerial perspective

My chief witness concerning this view is a short work which has been largely ignored in the current discussion about that story: On the medieval origins of the modern state, by the American historian Joseph Strayer. One reason for putting it first is its explicit focus on the

early phases of that story, coupled however with a suggestion that 'the modern state, wherever we find it today, is based on the pattern which emerged in Europe in the period 1100 to 1600'(12). Over this time

[w]e are looking for the appearance of political units persisting in time and fixed in space, the development of permanent, impersonal institutions, agreement on the need for an authority which can give final judgements, and acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic loyalty of its subjects. (Strayer 1970: 10)

The book's relevance in our context rests on its focus on the top-down aspect of the process, that is on the developing practices and assumptions concerning the political administration of larger territories. Strayer emphasises both the traits common to most Western European experiences (for instance, the practices of consultation between rulers and other powerful individuals or bodies or the importance of law) and some of the contrasts relating to these matters between countries, especially England and France.

The key process, in Strayer's view, consists in the establishment of increasingly effective modes of management of larger and larger territories, put into place on behalf of rulers by growing bodies of professional administrators. He thus concerns himself to a large extent with the evolving practices relating to the recruitment, training and employment of those administrators, and with the distinctive practices which they develop (often quite self-consciously) and which later become to an extent traditional.

How distinctive and pointed this argument is, in spite of the low-key way in which Strayer advances, shows from what is missing from it – in particular, any bloody-minded, Schmittian sense of the heroic distinctiveness of the political enterprise, of the centrality of the confrontation with 'the Other', of the momentousness and drama of political decision, of 'the demoniac face of power' (Ritter 1979).

As Strayer depicts it, the development of the modern state is chiefly an ongoing, low-profile process of inventing and adopting / adapting marginally (though sometimes markedly) more effective ways of collecting and husbanding resources, of controlling their employment, of providing services (especially judicial and 'police' services) to local communities. As he remarks pointedly, 'the first permanent institutions in Western Europe dealt with internal not external affairs. High courts of justice and Treasury Departments existed long before Foreign Offices and Departments of Defence' (1970: 26).

The individuals active in these primordial offices play the key role in getting a population, in spite of its intense localism, to accept and value the existence of a centrally controlled framework of rule, to which it increasingly refers in defining its interests and obligations, and to develop a sense of trans-local commonality (this, Strayer argues, happened first in England). Thus, political units in the process of becoming states are not seen in the first place as conquering entities, but as the growing estates of dominant dynasties, assisted chiefly by managers intent, day-in day-out, upon tending and increasing the dynasty's possessions.

Strayer refers occasionally to the role played in the above process by ecclesiastical personnel, who contributed to it on the one hand a distinctive concern with establishing and maintaining peace, on the other some critical resources, such as literacy and the use of Latin as a trans-local language; and a sense of what it means for a local collectivity (a parish, an abbey) to belong to a higher one (a dioceses, the Church at large, a religious order as a whole).

Some years after the publication of Strayer's book, a distinguished legal scholar, Harold Berman, argued at length in an impressive book, Law and revolution, a much stronger version of that argument. He does not simply point to the contribution made by ecclesiastics and their distinctive ways of thinking and acting to the construction of states, but holds that 'the first state in the West was that which was established in the church by the papacy in the late eleventh and the twelfth century' (Berman 1983: 276). This is chiefly because the Gregorian reformation made express and sustained use of sophisticated, text-based, secular, 'rational', institutionally differentiated legal discourse in order to institute, activate, and co-ordinate ecclesiastical organs - and such discourse was later much used, in properly political bodies, to orient and control binding decisions, including those involving the threat of or the recourse to violence.

Although Strayer had already acknowledged the uses of law in the performance of managerial tasks, Berman follows and complements an earlier tradition of legal and constitutional history in emphasising the wider significance of law in state-building. Why is law important, and particularly enacted, non-customary law? For one thing, it permits two contrasting requirements to be fulfilled: on the one hand it reduces the contingency in the conduct of public bodies and in the determination of the obligations of subjects / citizens toward them, by tying them to expressly promulgated commands valid in principle 'wherever and whenever'; on the other hand, each such law is itself contingent, for, by following certain procedural rules (themselves juridical in nature), it can be set aside by another one. Thus,

administrative and judicial bodies can be programmed to act in predictable ways, but that programming is itself variable. Also, the validity of existent bodies of law can be extended to new territories, facilitating their incorporation in a given polity,

Furthermore, in the West, on various grounds, law long enjoyed high moral and cultural prestige. It is a sophisticated, highly literate intellectual product, which can be systematized, taught, and examined, and can thus assist rulers and their top administrators in the process of selecting and training the specialized personnel which, through the first centuries of the modern state, is increasingly called upon to replace the feudal and the clerical elements in manning the political establishment. To this extent, Berman's sustained concern with the legal dimension in the development of papal institutions usefully complements Strayer's primary emphasis on other aspects of the management of royal territories.

The military perspective

The state is the central political institution; qua political, it has an intrinsic connection with violence, emphasised in a famous definition of the state by Weber which Randall Collins has elaborated as follows:

By 'state' we mean a way in which violence is organized. The state consists in individuals in possession of firearms and other weaponry and willing to put them to use: in the version of political organization found in the modern world, these individuals claim the monopoly of such use.....The state is, in the first instance, the army and the police. (Collins 1975: 181)

Although the distinction itself between army and police is a historical product, and can be institutionalized to a different extent, this statement suggests two different ways in which this theme can be elaborated: one which emphasises primarily what we may call the 'internal' uses of organized violence - law enforcement, the repression and suppression of threats to the public order, by the police and the judicial system - and one which emphasises its 'external' uses - war and the military establishment. But in the literature on state development the first mode of elaboration is much less significant, although significant moves in its direction could be derived, in particular, from Foucault's writings on punishment and surveillance. The second, on the other hand, has been much practiced in the past, and recently has enjoyed something of a revival. It is, furthermore, more likely to inspire reflections about other significant themes of political theorizing, such as the moral significance of violence in general and war in particular, or such concepts as sovereignty, territory, the states system, political obligation.

In the context of the discussion about state development, the argument for the significance of war is straightforward. From the beginning, the modern state was shaped by the fact of being essentially intended for war-making, and primarily concerned with establishing and maintaining its military might. In turn, the fortunes of war played the decisive role in shaping the map of Europe and thus the original context of the states system, which found in war the irreplaceable instrument for periodically revising its equilibrium.

Early in the 20th century Otto Hintze claimed most succinctly that according to all comparative, 'all state constitution is originally war constitution, military constitution' (Hintze 1970: 53). Later elaborations of this thesis emphasise not so much a direct link, say, between the distribution of military capacities within a population and the structure of the polity, but rather an indirect one: each state derives its institutional arrangements chiefly from the ways in which it goes about providing itself with 'the sinews of war' - the material resources necessary to equip itself militarily. Bertrand de Jouvenel's statement of the argument exemplifies this emphasis:

The intimate tie between war and power is a constant feature of European history..... If a feudal monarchy succeeded in getting financial aids from the vassals at more and more frequent intervals and could thus increase the number of mercenaries in its employ, the others had to copy it. If in the end these aids were consolidated into a permanent tax for maintaining a standing army, the movement had to be followed. For, as Adam Smith remarked, 'Once the system of having a standing army had been adopted by one civilized nation, all its neighbours had to introduce it; security reasons made it inevitable, for the old militias were quite incapable of resisting an army of this kind' (de Jouvenel 1962: 142)

A recent, very strong re-statement of this point, by Tilly (1990), suggests that state structures at large be understood as secondary products of the rulers' efforts to provide themselves with military resources. On the face of it, this might seem to apply only to the core administrative and fiscal structures, those established in the early and middle phases of state development; but one might argue that even arrangements typical of its late phases, and apparently remote from military concerns, sometimes have a military rationale. For instance, some of the early welfare state provisions introduced by the British state were a response to the realization, in the course of the Boer war, that many of the young males brought up in the industrial conurbations were in inadequate physical condition, and thus poorly fit for fighting.

A significant component of this kind of argument has always been the connection between the challenge of war on the one hand, and a tendency to tighten the hold of the centre on the political organs of the periphery of the state. In other words, the proximity, the awareness, the urgency of that challenge have generated and sustained the 'centralization trend' typical of maturing states. Note that this connection is not a prerogative of European states; it can be found in United States, operating in a very different environment, and originally fashioned with the express intent of transcending the European experience. For instance, a recent book by R.F. Bense (1990) emphasises the role played by the American Civil War in fostering the progress of central political institutions both in the US and in the Confederacy.

Two significant aspects of the military perspective on state development may be noted. In the first place, its frequent emphasis on fiscal arrangements creates a kind of thematic overlap with what I have called the managerial perspective. In the second place, by the same token it also connects the study of political arrangements with the arrangements dominant in two other spheres of social experience: on the one hand the economy, on the other technology - particularly, of course, the technology of warfare.

This last connection, in particular, is extensively explored in some of the more sophisticated studies developing the military perspective. Warfare technology, itself, is a complex matter: one aspect of it is strictly material, and has to do with the power, precision, and other operational features of the military hardware; the other is largely social, and is constituted chiefly by the ways in which military manpower is raised, trained, deployed, organized, monitored, motivated, etc.

Recent studies have made much of the relationship between the early-modern 'military revolution', characterized largely in material terms, and changes in the political, fiscal, administrative arrangements of European states. The title and subtitle of Brian Downing's, Military revolution and political change: Origins of democracy and autocracy in early modern Europe, neatly convey the message.

In fact, title and subtitle suggest two different emphases, in this book as well as in others adopting the same perspective: a (let us call it) 'narrative' emphasis, stressing continuities and discontinuities -- of military practice in this case -- and the relative adaptations; and a comparative emphasis, stressing instead the variations in those adaptations.

In the latter perspective what matters are the different, indeed divergent ways in which rulers respond to developments in the technology (material and social) of warfare.

The broadest generalization suggested by writings advancing this perspective, is that the military revolution makes it necessary for states, if they want to remain in business, to commandeer more resources than the arrangements inherited from the late-medieval past can put at their disposal. Those arrangements (which can be subsumed under one variant or the other of the so-called Ständestaat, or 'polity of estates') must be either suppressed or complemented by others which increase the discretion of rulers and/or capitalize on the parallel process of economic modernization.

In most cases, the ancient pattern of decentralized military capacity and of ad hoc financial levies is replaced by one of three, all of which substantially increase the extraction of resources to be put to military uses. The main contrast lies perhaps between Prussia and England: the first develops a pattern of 'authoritarian' extraction, associated chiefly with a new, centrally imposed and run system of taxation; the latter, a pattern of 'negotiated' extraction, which involves first the court, later Parliament as the representative organ of society, and which taps the new resource base constituted by an increasingly commercialized economy via both taxation and (increasingly) a flexible, responsible public debt system. But one must add at least the French pattern, whereby the monarch puts the state in hock by means of a ruinous process of indebtedment with which taxation can never catch up.

One reason why much attention has been recently devoted to how such matters were settled in the 17th and early 18th century is the sense that each of the patterns (and their variants) makes a huge difference to the nature of the state at large, including whether, to what extent, at what point, it opens itself to constitutionalism, representative government, liberalism. (A book by Thomas Ertman, 1997, is particularly significant in this context). But of course the perspective also includes later developments in the relation between war and state-making; in particular, it is often claimed that there is a significant connection between, at one end, the advent of mass armies in the late 18th century and early 19th century, and continuing since then; at the other end, 'the entry of masses into politics' characteristic of the later part of the 19th and of the 20th century. In other terms, the military perspective on state development lends itself to extensive and sophisticated elaboration.

The economic perspective

In the interpretation just discussed, the development of the modern state finds its basic rationale in a phenomenon - war - which is a (perhaps the) most significant aspect of the

political sphere. The next interpretation, however, shifts the focus to a different sphere, the economic one, where take place the processes of production and distribution of material wealth, and views as aspects and components of those processes, and of the resulting conflicts, political phenomena in general, and the formation and development of the state in particular. This line of thinking has as its main proponents Karl Marx and various thinkers chiefly inspired by him; thus my exposition of it must seek to convey, in however elementary a fashion, the main contentions of Marx's views on politics and the state.

Human life can only be sustained through labour. Beyond a minimal threshold of effectiveness, labour, in its interaction with nature, can yield a greater product than is strictly necessary to reconstitute the individual's capacity to labour, in the form both of product which is surplus to the consumption needs of producers and of embodied products of past labour to be used as instruments of further labour. But both surpluses, being objectivized, can be taken away from those producing them, and put to the service, and placed under the control, of individuals not themselves responsible for producing them.

Typically, the privilege of consuming more than one contributes to the social production process is enjoyed by a minority who make the majority work to own advantage; thus it is intrinsically invidious and contentious, and exposed to the risk of being challenged by the majority. On this account, the minority / majority relationship is always potentially unstable, and must be stabilized by processes external to those of material production: chiefly, the production of symbolic and ideological resources which moderate or divert the majority's resentment of and opposition to their condition, and an asymmetric allocation also of the capacity to exercise coercion.

This capacity (grounded on control over means of violence, including organization) may play either a direct role in the production / exploitation process (as in slavery or serfdom) or only (or chiefly) an indirect role. In particular, the 'feudal mode of production' required the overt submission of the producers to the political superiority of the exploiters, and to the threat of open coercion, because some means of production were under the producers' immediate control. This situation was compatible with (and indeed conducive to) the decentralization of authority, and of coercive resources, characteristic of feudalism in its political aspects.

However, in the capitalist mode of production, according to Marx, exploitation is achieved in a covert manner, not by expressly subjecting the producers to the exploiters, but by means of voluntarily entered, contractual relations between formally free individuals, once

these have been dispossessed of any autonomous control over the means of production. This pattern required that rearrangement of political relations and of juridical arrangements which is the core of state development, at any rate in its domestic aspects. In particular:

- Capitalism entails production for the market, centred on exchange values, not on use. As such it requires orderly, purposefully organized co-operation within units and secure exchange between units. An intrinsic aspect of state formation and of the unification of jurisdictions it involves, is the widening territorial reach of power centres, which standardize and secure relations between many individuals across wide spaces, making production and exchange easier and more calculable, and more open to continuing rationalization.
- The development of the modern state is associated, particularly on the Continent, with two fundamental developments in the field of private law: the return to the absolute Roman conception of property (dominium), and the establishment of contract as the key device for the creation and transmission of rights. Both are indispensable to the mobilization of wealth and to the creation of contingent, open-ended, cash-oriented relations between exchange partners.
- In particular, the contractualization of employer / employee relations allows capitalists to dismiss any responsibility for the workers' livelihood, to treat labour (power) as commodity, buying it to the extent and for the duration required for production and in the light of present or expected market demand and on terms set in turn by the market. According to Marx, this construction of employer / employee relations is critical because it hides the intrinsically exploitative character of the employment relation, wherein the systematic inferiority of all employees (qua members of a class) toward all employers (qua members of a class) allows the latter to extract unpaid labour from the former, without seeming to.
- The secular movement from 'status' to 'contract' characteristic of modern law also leads to the emergence of a new kind of collective actor - class: a unit of a non-corporate nature, based purely on the convergence of the factual interests of its components, rather than on publicly recognized privileges. To this socio-economic development corresponds, in political terms, a long-run movement toward the formal equality of all citizens which is characteristic of the state.

The absolutization of property allows the abolition of property forms of communal nature, and thus the expropriation of resources which previously allowed the members of subaltern groups to subsist autonomously, if only on a collective basis, forcing them into the new

dependency characteristic of salaried labour. 'Absolute' property also entitles those who own it to a privileged claim on the deployment of that coercive power which the state has progressively monopolized and vested in the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, within the new places of production, and signally within the factory, it grounds a despotic control by the capitalist over the expenditure of labour power by workers and over their product, to the end of maximizing profit.

These aspects of the 'statualization' of political relations deliver significant, indeed essential requisites of the formation and advance of the capitalist mode of production. Like other, premodern forms of political order, the state is thus critically implicated in upholding the central form of inequality, that constituted by the control, or the exclusion from control, over the means of production characteristic of a given situation: ruling practices secure the exploitation process and the advantages of the dominant minority. For the same reason, all significant changes in the socio-economic order presuppose a substantial development in the means and the relations of production, but must also have a political dimension, resulting in the changed nature of the ruling class. Thus, for all the differences it may reveal in its phases and in its locales, the modern state also entails the ascent of the bourgeoisie also to a dominant political role. In a famous sentence of the Manifesto, 'the government is but the executive committee of the bourgeoisie' (ref#).

For this very reason Marx, Engels, and many Marxist authors display a certain interest in political developments, assuming that certain developments in the formation of public policies, and particularly those centring on the emergence of parties, would in turn play a role in the political dimension of the socialist revolution. However Marx himself, at any rate from the mid 1840's on, paid little sustained attention to major changes in the institutional forms of the state. One might suspect that a more or less explicit economic bias, while it allows Marx and others to develop (what strikes me as) an insightful view of the process of state development as a whole, seriously limits their capacity for appreciating some significant aspects of it.

At any rate, in the early twentieth century, following Hobson, Lenin interprets imperialism as the 'supreme phase' of capitalism, allowing the ruling classes of the West to delay its inevitable fate, and placing the class struggle on we would call today a global footing. By and large, Marx-inspired writers treat war as the extreme limit case of the conflict between 'national fractions' of capital over opportunities for accumulation and/or as ways of diverting the working masses from pursuing their class interest. They interpret fascism chiefly as a different, but not hugely different way of organizing and conducting the business-as-

usual of the state in countries where financial capital has prevailed over other forms, and where the bourgeoisie feels particularly threatened by the class war.

Valuable as some of these interpretations may be, they mostly revolve on the question, what kind of political order is necessary for what kind of economic order. Since the latter is conceptualized in a rather simple way, as a succession of only four modes of production (ancient, feudal, Asiatic, capitalist) this mode of analysis becomes essentially unilinear, and pays little attention to the historical variants of the respective political orders - a lack of attention which in the twentieth century was to have unfortunate practical consequences, such as the early refusal of the communist parties outside the Soviet Union, but controlled by the Comintern, to take on board the gravity of the appearance of fascism, and to make a resolute stand for the defence of democratic institutions in the West.

But the interpretation outlined above is only a partial rendering of the Marxist perspective on state development, reflecting only its 'objectivist', systemic/functionalist side. Marx's own thinking has another side which emphasises the class struggle, and acknowledges to some extent the plurality of its protagonists, the variety of the respective interests, and the strategic component in their relations (which class allies itself with which, against which, with what success or lack of it). In this context, it can attribute some significance, among other things, to the various political arrangements associated with those strategies and with their outcomes.

Within the Marxist camp (broadly understood) the best work in this manner, as concerns our topic, is probably that done by Perry Anderson. However, an even more impressive, imaginative framework of analysis focussed on classes and their strategies, and expressly concerned with varieties of political development and (among other things) of state construction, is embodied in a masterpiece by Barrington Moore, jr.: Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. I wind up this essay by briefly considering this book because, while reflecting upon the early modern era, it is concerned chiefly with a later development, the commercialization of the countryside, and seeks to account for even later ones, such as the nazism and fascism, and the communist-led revolutions of the twentieth century. It also has an expressly comparative focus, as its title itself makes clear.

Moore's relationship to Marx and Marxism is complex. He shares that tradition's tough-minded emphasis on revolution and on revolutionary violence, the attribution to classes and class interest of the key role in historical development, the assumption that the key relationship between dominant and subaltern groups is one of exploitation, however masked

by pretences to the 'functional' contribution of the former to the welfare of the latter, the systematic discounting of the significance of 'values' and other cultural factors. However, as indicated above, he considers the countryside as the central stage of modernization processes, and landowners and peasants as its protagonists; he adds to these the ruler and its apparatus, and the town-based burgher and then bourgeois groups - but the working class is nearly nowhere, even in considering twentieth-century events.

Even Moore's construction of at any rate some moments in the development of the bourgeoisie is at variance from the standard Marxist construction. He somewhat half-heartedly concedes, in particular, that the French revolution may be labelled 'bourgeois', but points out that the bourgeoisie in question had little to do with capitalism proper, and even less with industrial capitalism.

Furthermore, Moore problematizes the Marxist assumption that exploited and oppressed groups will revolt; he also has an acute sense of the contingent nature of major social developments and of the attendant ironies - see for example one of his chapters headings: 'England and the contribution of violence to gradualism'! It is again ironic that those revolutions in which peasants have played the most significant role (in the twentieth century, the Russian and the Chinese) are also those which in the end imposed on them the greatest costs and defeats. Even more significant, in our context, is Moore's sense that political institutions matter, and so do differences between them; particularly valuable are those that impose constraints on the arbitrium, allow the development of just and rational rules, and give the populace some voice in their making.

Finally, as I have already suggested, Moore attaches great weight to the strategic components in the operation of major social groupings, and particularly to their positive or negative alignments and the resultant arrangements in the political sphere. The argument to this effect is alas too complex to be reviewed here. But when all is said and done, as I see the matter, Social origins, in an original and sophisticated manner, interprets many critical aspects of political modernization, including some relating to time, nature and shape of statualization, chiefly in the light of the interests of groups constituted around questions of control or exclusion from economic resources. On these grounds, it develops a significant, though of course controversial, interpretation of such events as the great revolutions of the twentieth century, and the rise of fascism and of collectivist states.

Conclusion

We have come a long way from a ruler's attempt to increase his dynastic patrimony and optimize its management at the very beginnings of the modern state, and to mentioned an attempt to analyse the fateful contrasts in the nature itself of the state enterprise in its twentieth-century phase. In this manner, the proposed, simple tripartition between 'perspectives' adopted by major students of state development appears relevant not just to the topic of this essay but to others pursued in the volume.

One may ask oneself which of these perspectives appears more relevant and reliable. The answer would have to be, predictably, that each has something to contribute, and that one should attempt, if anything, to achieve a synthesis between them rather than compel a choice. Some recent works already mentioned expressly aim at such a synthesis: for instance, Tilly's utilizes insights proper to the military and the economic perspectives; and Ertman does the same thing within a framework which, by emphasising the significance of administrative arrangements, may remind the reader also of the managerial perspective. And one may already see the elements of a masterful synthesis in some of Max Weber's many contributions to the topic, culminating perhaps in the wonderfully compressed version offered in 'The Profession and Vocation of Politics'.

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