

Gillis, John R., *Memory and Identity: the History of a Relationship* in: Gillis, John R. (ed.), *Commemorations: the Politics of National Identity*, Princeton & N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 3-26.

Introduction

MEMORY AND IDENTITY: THE HISTORY OF A RELATIONSHIP

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MEMORY AND IDENTITY are two of the most frequently used terms in contemporary public and private discourse, though their status as key words is relatively recent.¹ Identity, a term first popularized by Erik Erickson in the late 1950s in connection with individual sense of self, subsequently took on such a bewildering variety of meanings that it became, in the words of Robert Coles, "The purest of clichés."² Memory also seems to be losing precise meaning in proportion to its growing rhetorical power.³ Today, both words resonate not just in their original Western contexts, but globally. Yet, in the process, they have lost all historical context. Detached from their original meanings, they have the status of free-floating phenomena, the same anywhere and anytime. Reconnecting memory and identity in time and place is the task that this volume undertakes.

The parallel lives of these two terms alert us to the fact that the notion of identity depends on the idea of memory, and vice versa. The core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely, a sense of sameness over time and space, is sustained by remembering; and what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity. That identities and memories change over time tends to be obscured by the fact that we too often refer to both as if they had the status of material objects—memory as something to be retrieved; identity as something that can be lost as well as found. We need to be reminded that memories and identities are not fixed things, but representations or constructions of reality, subjective rather than objective phenomena. As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, we are constantly revising our memories to suit our current identities. Memories help us make sense of the world we live in; and "memory work" is, like any other kind of physical or mental labor, embedded in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end.⁴

If memory has its politics, so too does identity. As Richard Handler points out, the Western world has been accustomed for more than two centuries to thinking about identity as an object bounded in time and space, as something with clear beginnings and endings, with its own terri-

toriality. David Lowenthal's essay shows how this way of thinking is now current throughout the world, providing the basis for what has been called "identity politics."⁵ Today it seems that everyone claims a right to their own identity. Individuals, subgroups, and nations all demand identity as if it were a necessity of life itself. Identity has taken on the status of a sacred object, an "ultimate concern," worth fighting and even dying for. To those who believe they do not have it, identity appears even more scarce and precious. On the other hand, contemporary society requires that we play so many different roles that at least some of us are afflicted by what Kenneth Gergen has called "multiphrenia," a condition of having too many conflicting selves, too many identities.⁶

I

Ironically, fierce battles over identity and memory are erupting at the very moment when psychologists, anthropologists, and historians are becoming increasingly aware of the subjective nature of both. These struggles make it all the more apparent that identities and memories are highly selective, inscriptive rather than descriptive, serving particular interests and ideological positions. Just as memory and identity support one another, they also sustain certain subjective positions, social boundaries, and, of course, power.

Every identity, notes Eric Leed, implies and at the same time masks a particular relationship.⁷ When we speak of *the* Germans, we imagine ourselves to be referring to some objective entity, but in fact we are participating in the process by which certain relationships among people we call Germans and between them and others we call *the* French or *the* Americans are constructed and sustained. We talk as if deprived of their berets the French would cease to be French; and, if they ceased to be punctual, Germans would no longer be German. The fact that only men traditionally wore berets and that punctuality is a class-based Prussian trait should alert us to the fact that in defining Frenchness and Germanness in these ways we are endorsing a certain gender order in one case and a specific political settlement in the other. National identities are, like everything historical, constructed and reconstructed; and it is our responsibility to decode them in order to discover the relationships they create and sustain.⁸ Today, the constructed nature of identities is becoming evident, particularly in the Western world, where the old bases of national identities are being rapidly undermined by economic globalization and transnational political integration. By inquiring further into the history of similar historical constructions, we are beginning to learn more about those who deploy them and whose interests they serve.

But recent critiques of national identity have scarcely weakened the

rhetical power of the word itself. From the period of the French and American revolutions through World War II, national identity asserted itself over the claims of both local and international relationships. Now it is these particularistic and cosmopolitan tendencies that challenge nationalism. In Europe we are confronted with quite contradictory tendencies toward unification and disintegration, a pattern that appears to be emerging in virtually every other part of the world as well.⁹

At this particular historical moment, it is all the more apparent that both identity and memory are political and social constructs, and should be treated as such. We can no longer afford to assign either the status of a natural object, treating it as "fact" with an existence outside language. Identities and memories are not things we think *about*, but things we think *with*. As such they have no existence beyond our politics, our social relations, and our histories. We must take responsibility for their uses and abuses, recognizing that every assertion of identity involves a choice that affects not just ourselves but others.

The relationship between memory and identity is historical; and the record of that relationship can be traced through various forms of commemoration discussed in this volume/Commemorative activity is by definition social and political, for it involves the coordination of individual and group memories, whose results may appear consensual when they are in fact the product of processes of intense contest, struggle, and, in some instances, annihilation. In this collection the focus is on public rather than private commemoration, though the parallels between the way identity and memory operate in personal and public life are striking and a reminder that the division between public and private is also historical, appearing natural only in retrospect.¹⁰

II

These essays were first presented at a conference on Public Memory and Collective Identity sponsored by the Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis in the spring of 1990. They range over a wide time span and equally broad geographical space. While there are many "blanks" still to be filled in, it is nevertheless possible to speculate on the broad outlines of the history of commemoration, which, at least for the Western world, can be divided into roughly three overlapping phases: the pre-national (before the late eighteenth century), the national (from the American and French revolutions to the 1960s), and the present, post-national phase.

We know very little about the early history of memory (or, more properly, memories), but what is certain is that its practice(s) was either highly localized or relatively cosmopolitan.¹¹ Pierre Nora argues that prior to the nineteenth century memory was such a pervasive part of life—the "milieu

of memory" is what he calls it—that people were hardly aware of its existence. Only the aristocracy, the church, and the monarchical state had need of institutionalized memory. Outside the elite classes, archives, genealogies, family portraits, and biographies were extremely rare; and there was no vast bureaucracy of memory as there is today. Ordinary people felt the past to be so much a part of their present that they perceived no urgent need to record, objectify, and preserve it.¹²

Popular memory appears to have differed from elite memory in important ways. While the latter attempted to create a consecutive account of all that had happened from a particular point in the past, popular memory made no effort to fill in all the blanks. If elite time marched in a more or less linear manner, popular time danced and leaped. Elite time colonized and helped construct the boundaries of territories that we have come to call nations. But popular time was more local as well as episodic, consolidating, as in rural Ulster today, certain "Great Days which rise out of time like hills off the land, signaling centers, letting boundaries drift from attention."¹³ This was not a time that could be contained within fixed boundaries. It was measured not from beginnings but from centers: "From the Great Days, time spreads both ways, backward and forward, to form seasons; seasons become years, years lost to time."¹⁴ Content to live in a present that ..contained both the past and the future, ordinary people did not feel compelled to invest in archives, monuments, and other permanent sites of memory, but rather they relied on living memory.

Under the old regimes, popular memories were neither very wide territorially nor, in the sense of a consecutive account from some distant past, very deep. When the Englishman Richard Gough constructed his *The History of Myddle* about 1700, he relied mainly on his own recollections and on what he had been "credibly informed by antient persons."¹⁵ Although Gough consulted manor court rolls, deeds, leases, and parish registers, his history was not for the most part something found in the archives. He did not experience the pastness of the past as we do. The parish church was Gough's site of memory, and he used the layout of the pews (which he reproduced in his book) to remind him of the families who occupied them. Because it was property-owning males (or their widows) who owned those pews, his account systematically ignores women, young persons, and propertyless people generally. Gough's narrative barely connects the history of Myddle with those of surrounding communities, much less with English history generally, with the result that those who left the village are permitted an identity only insofar as they are connected to the place itself. There are no English people in Myddle, only Myddle people in England. A specifically English identity, based on a specifically English memory, had little meaning to Gough or his contemporaries.

INTRODUCTION

III

As David Cressy's contribution to this volume suggests, a different kind of memory was already developing in England under the Tudors and the Stuarts. A set of memories that were not purely local or cosmopolitan arose in sixteenth-century England out of the convergence of Protestantism and Tudor dynastic motivations. The self-conceptions of "God's Englishmen," who, like the chosen people of the Old Testament, claimed for themselves a unique future as well as a distinctive past, required an investment in new forms of memory. But this scarcely penetrated the consciousness of more than a small part of the population. Institutionalized forms of memory were too precious to be wasted on the common people. Furthermore, Protestants had no wish to commemorate with Catholics and vice versa. Prior to the era of the French and American revolutions, memory tended to divide rather than unite, just as it continues to do in places like northern Ireland.¹⁶

This began to change as a result of the simultaneous political and economic revolutions of the late eighteenth century.¹⁷ The demand for commemoration was then taken up by the urban middle and working classes, gradually expanding until, today, everyone is obsessed with recording, preserving, and remembering. According to Nora, "we speak so much of memory because there is so little of it left," referring to the kind of living memory, communicated face to face, that still exists in rural Ireland, but which now has to compete with a multitude of other memories, some official, others commercialized.¹⁸

National memory is shared by people who have never seen or heard of one another, yet who regard themselves as having a common history. They are bound together as much by forgetting as by remembering, for modern memory was born at a moment when Americans and Europeans launched a massive effort to reject the past and construct a radically new future. The American revolutionaries urged their compatriots to forget everything and start afresh. Jefferson declared that "the dead have no rights. . . . Our Creator made the world for the use of the living and not of the dead." And the French Republic embarked on the extraordinary project of altering the time consciousness of the entire Christian world by declaring 1792 to be Year I, a symbol of their conception of new beginnings.¹⁹

New memories required concerted forgettings, a process Benedict Anderson describes as collective amnesia. Changes occurring at the economic as well as the political level created such a sense of distance between now and then that people found it impossible to remember what life had been like only a few decades earlier. The past went blank and had to be filled in, a task taken up with great fervor by professional historians from the early

nineteenth century onward. Their task, as Jules Michelet conceived it, was to speak for past generations, to bestow on them a national history regardless of whether they were aware of themselves as French, German, or English at the time they were alive.²⁰

In the case of both the French and American revolutions, the need to commemorate arose directly out of an ideologically driven desire to break with the past, to construct as great a distance as possible between the new age and the old. It was the French revolutionaries who invented the "Old Regime," exaggerating its backwardness as well as its injustices in order to justify their claim that 1789 represented a remarkable leap forward. Conceiving of themselves as standing at the starting point of a new era, revolutionaries on both sides of the Atlantic created a cult of new beginnings and, with it, a whole set of memory practices and sites that were as controversial then as they are today.²¹

As Mona Ozouf's vivid account of the festive life of the French Revolution suggests, it was the cult of new beginnings that produced the first truly national commemoration in Europe, centering on July 14, the date of the Fall of the Bastille.²² The Americans, who liked to think of their revolution in terms of continuity rather than total rupture, were slower to create a national holiday. As John Bodnar tells us, July 4 was not celebrated nationally until the 1820s, at a point when Americans had begun to feel that history was accelerating and the heroic past was slipping away from them.²³

By contrast, the British, who insisted on the continuity of their history, produced no official holidays of a patriotic kind, confirming Nora's point that temporal and topographical memory sites emerge at those times and in those places where there is a perceived or constructed break with the past.²⁴ But, even though continuity of the state precluded commemorations on a national scale, the British nevertheless produced many new commemorative practices as a result of their experience of the disruptive effects of their industrial revolution. Memory was as central to the making of English working-class identities as it was to the class consciousness of the British bourgeoisie, both of which were constructed in the nineteenth century. Modern memory was born not just from the sense of a break with the past, but from an intense awareness of the conflicting representations of the past and the effort of each group to make its version the basis of national identity.²⁵

This is not to say that there is something automatic about commemorative activity. In both Europe and North America, national commemorations were fiercely contested from the very beginning. French conservatives objected to the concept of the nation and refused to participate in its anniversaries, preferring to remember instead the birth and death dates of the Bourbons. The peasantry refused to exchange local for national mem-

ory until almost the First World War, and then only when they had been effectively colonized by the state.²⁶

But even those who subscribed to the idea of a sovereign people could divide on what should constitute the national identity; and it was not until 1880 that Bastille Day became a permanent part of France's public calendar. In Philadelphia, the place where American independence was declared, there was no consensus on how the anniversary should be honored until the 1850s. Rival elites and working-class groups paraded their differences in the streets, sometimes clashing violently over the interpretation of the revolutionary heritage. It was only when this struggle abated that Americans began to celebrate July 4 in a consensual manner.²⁷

The fact that both new nations were initially so fragile only seems to have intensified the commemorative efforts. If the conflicts of the present seemed intractable, the past offered a screen on which desires for unity and continuity, that is, identity, could be projected. In both France and the United States, the foundational moment took on mythic proportions in the eyes of succeeding generations.²⁸ For the left, it was a time of heroes, pure idealism, and perfect consensus. For the right, it remained a moment of villainy, degradation, and disintegration. What they had in common, however, was their belief in a national memory as well as a national identity, something 'that, as Herman Lebovics's essay on the fierce debates in France in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrates, was evident in all subsequent political struggles.

New nations as well as old states require ancient pasts. As soon as Germany unified, its elites also felt a desperate need to commemorate. In a relatively brief time they too constructed what they regarded as a truly Germanic heritage, but, as Rudy Koshar observes, "concepts of identity and memory are subverted by being posited," and the Germans soon found themselves as divided as the French concerning their newfound legacy. Koshar's essay shows how the historic preservation movement floundered from the very beginning, while Yael Zerubavel's study of the Israeli legend of settler heroism at Tel Hai shows how it has been contested and revised right from its beginnings in the 1920s to the present day.

IV

Nineteenth-century commemorations were largely for, but not of, the people. Fallen kings and martyred revolutionary leaders were remembered, generals had their memorials, but ordinary participants in war and revolution were consigned to oblivion. Plans drawn up in France as early as 1792 to give fallen citizen soldiers of the new Republic a place of burial in the very center of Paris never materialized.²⁹ Throughout the nineteenth century only officers had their graves marked and their names inscribed on

European war memorials. The first military cemeteries were created during the American Civil War, but Europeans did not take up the idea that men who fought together should be buried together.

Yet American memory was selective in other ways. As Kirk Savage shows us in his fascinating account of post—Civil War monument building in the American North and South, these memories in stone provided a basis for \consensus between old enemies. However, they were the icons of whites only. Post—Civil War American identity was forged by forgetting the contributions of African Americans to the military effort, forgetting even what the struggle had been about. Faced with oblivion as the quintessential American "other," ex-slaves invented their own commemoration of the Emancipation Proclamation, known to them (and largely only to them) as "Juneteenth."³⁰

Or, both sides of the Atlantic, national commemorations were largely the preserve of elite males, the designated carriers of progress, who, as a consequence of newly defined gender divisions, felt the past to be slipping away from them much faster than did women. The new imperatives of individualism set men on a fast track, producing among them a profound sense of losing touch with the past. Thought of as belonging more to the past, women came to serve in various (and usually unpaid) ways as the keepers and embodiments of memory. They provided consolation to men terrified that they had become rootless as a result of their own upward and outward mobility.³¹

The role of women in national commemoration was largely allegorical, however. The figure of Liberty came to stand in both France and the United States as a symbol of national identity, but the history of real women was systematically forgotten.³² In the old regimes, famous queens were remembered, but in the new democracies even so important a figure as Victoria was commemorated mainly as a wife and mother, not as a political figure.³³ The creation of national mother's days in America and Europe on the eve of the First World War simply underlined the gendered nature of national commemorative practice, for it was not for their deeds but for their being that women were remembered.³⁴

Workers, racial minorities, young people, and women gained admission to national memories at an even slower pace than they were admitted to national representative and educational institutions. Ironically, it was the dominant male elites, who imagined themselves at the cutting edge of progress, who, feeling the loss of the past most acutely, were most insistent that it be restored and preserved. Until very recently they were also the only ones to be commemorated. Women and minorities often serve as symbols of a "lost" past, nostalgically perceived and romantically constructed, but their actual lives are most readily forgotten. Americans now celebrate Martin Luther King, Jr., with a national holiday, but they have yet to

memorialize a woman. Apart from Queen Victoria, virtually all the women to whom monuments are erected in France and England are figures of premodern times.³⁵

V

It is also one of the peculiarities of the national phase of commemoration that it consistently preferred the dead to the living. The old regimes felt more comfortable with honoring both because before the Enlightenment had thoroughly disenchanting the world, the dead and the living were perceived as inhabiting the same space and time. In an era when there was less finality about death, the dead haunted the living, who seem to have felt a greater need to forget than to remember.

By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the living had begun to haunt the dead, interring them in elaborately maintained cemeteries, visiting their graves, even attempting to communicate with them through spiritualist mediums.³⁶ Middle-class Victorians were the first generation to deny death and have trouble letting go of the dead. But by the end of the nineteenth century the cult of the dead had become democratized, and in the course of the First World War resort to spiritualist mediums became a mass phenomenon.³⁷ Europeans adopted the American notion of military cemeteries, where officers and men would finally lie side by side. Post-World War I memorials were qualitatively as well as quantitatively different from anything that had gone before. As Thomas Laqueur's essay demonstrates, nations now felt the need to leave a tangible trace of all their dead either through graves or inscriptions.³⁸ The effort to preserve a trace of every fallen soldier reached its limits in the interwar period with the monument building in France during the 1920s described here by Daniel Sherman. The scale of death was so massive and so many mortal remains were missing that all the major combatant nations eventually resorted to erecting the so-called tombs of unknown soldiers, thereby remembering everyone by remembering no one in particular. This was the only way that memory of this terrible period of time could be materialized in a single place.

Yet, as national memory practices became more democratic, they also became more impersonal. Kurt Piehler describes how American families refused to surrender their sons' bodies to foreign soil. In Europe, where the state was stronger, even death did not release a man from national service. In the interwar period the spirit and image of the fallen were repeatedly mobilized on film as well as in political rhetoric to serve a variety of causes, left as well as right. They had become the very embodiment of national identities in virtually every place but the new Soviet Union, where the war was seen as a wasted imperialist venture. The industrialization of modern

warfare had consigned individual heroism to oblivion. Even the victors commemorated sacrifice rather than triumph; and, in Germany, where defeat and revolution were perceived as a total breach with the past, the dead came to stand for all that was worthy in the German past and redeeming in its future.³⁹ No wonder that men who survived the war often identified with the dead, for there were few tributes, material or symbolic, for World War I veterans, few lands fit for heroes, much less for heroines. „ As for the women who had contributed so much to the world's first total 'war effort, there would be no monuments. Their assigned role was still, as it was in the private cults of the dead in the nineteenth century, that of chief mourners and mediums. The organized cemetery pilgrimages popular during the interwar years were largely women's affairs.⁴⁰ In the era of Nazism and Fascism, when nations tried to suppress class if not ethnic differences, the gender division of memory became even more pronounced. Women remembered the men, while their own contributions were represented largely in terms of sacrifice, a traditional female role that only reinforced gender stereotypes.

VI

It was not until after the Second World War that national commemoration began to alter. Of the great powers, only the Soviet Union, which had not been able to honor its dead of the first war because of that conflict's association with the czarist regime, encouraged the cult of the dead on a mass scale. The Germans were forbidden to build military cemeteries until the 1950s; and many of their old memorials were pulled down by the occupying allies, who preferred that Germans forget the Prussian tradition.⁴¹ The Japanese were similarly encouraged to forget their militaristic past, something that they were quite willing to do. Japan proved particularly adept at constructing a cult of new beginnings, treating the war as an aberration and reading its history as if it had begun in 1945.⁴²

Constructing a new Japan and two new Germanies demanded forgetting rather than remembering. Even Jews focused more on the present than the past in the first years of the new state of Israel. The memories of individual survivors were vivid enough, but it was not until the late 1950s that they found expression in a collective memory of "Holocaust," a concept that came into popular circulation in Israel only after the new state was firmly established and Jews could begin to reflect on the pastness of the European past. When the memory of those terrible events could no longer be taken for granted, there was suddenly a powerful reason to commemorate, to save both individual and collective recollections from oblivion.

But even among the victorious nations memory took a different shape after World War II. This second round of total war had resulted in more civilian than military deaths, and it was no longer possible to ignore the

contributions made at the home front. Military cemeteries were constructed, but so too were so-called living memorials—churches, sports stadiums, parks, and hospitals—which had begun to be erected in America in the 1920s and 1930s and now began to fill the bombed-out spaces of Europe as well. The cult of the fallen soldier was replaced by a new emphasis on veterans, who were immensely better treated than any of their predecessors. This time around the promise of a land fit for heroes would not go unfulfilled. The fact that the returning soldiers could actually find a place in the present reduced considerably the pressure to memorialize them. Parades replaced cemetery pilgrimages as the typical memorial day activity. Now it became possible for women, even those who had not been mobilized, to feel that they too had been a part of history, not just as widows and war mothers, making sacrifices through husbands and sons, but in their own right. While the memory of women war workers was not to gain public recognition until the 1970s, the door to national memory was now ajar, not only for them but for racial and sexual minorities.⁴³

The Cold War contributed in its own way to shifts in the forms and location of memory. The blurring of the old distinction between war and peace meant that it was very difficult to define the beginnings or endings that had previously been the focus of memory. The Korean, Algerian, and Vietnam conflicts proved extremely difficult to commemorate, except on a private basis. The Korean conflict has yet to receive a national monument; and the Vietnam Memorial, with its wall of names, is generally agreed to represent a turning point in the history of public memory, a decisive departure from the anonymity of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and a growing acknowledgment that everyone now deserves equal recognition at all times in wholly accessible places.⁴⁴

In contrast to the highly institutionalized rites of memory carried out at set times across the river at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, the memorial on the Mall stimulates an anarchy of memory. At Arlington it is the honor guard that performs the rites of remembering, limiting the spectators largely to the role of audience. Most visitors confine their activity to picture taking, thus further distancing themselves from the event itself. By contrast, the monument on the Mall is an event, demanding that everyone who passes by do his or her duty to memory in one way or another. To visit both places is to move not just in space, but in time. Arlington and the Mall belong not just to two different sides of the Potomac, but two different eras in the history of commemoration, the national and the post-national.

VII

By the late 1960s the era of national commemoration was clearly drawing to a close, but not before bequeathing to later generations a plethora of

monuments, holidays, cemeteries, museums, and archives that still continue to function today. These remain very effective in concentrating time in space, in providing many people with a sense of common identity no matter how dispersed they may be by class, region, gender, religion, or race. Millions still make their secular pilgrimages to places like Gettysburg, Auschwitz, and Hiroshima, but no longer in quite the same compulsory, ritualized manner.

We are more likely to do our "memory work" at times and places of our own choosing. Whereas there was once "a time and a place for everything," the distinctions between different kinds of times and places seem to be collapsing. As global markets work around the clock and the speed of communications shrinks our sense of distance, there is both more memory work to do and less time and space to do it in. As the world implodes upon us, we feel an even greater pressure as individuals to record, preserve, and collect. Again, Pierre Nora: "When memory is no longer everywhere, it will not be anywhere unless one takes the responsibility to recapture it through individual means."⁴⁵

In the past two decades memory has simultaneously become more global and more local. Events and places with international meaning such as Hiroshima, Chernobyl, Auschwitz, and Nanjing capture the world's attention even when the nations responsible may wish to forget them.⁴⁶ At the same time, people now prefer to devote more time to local, ethnic, and family memory, often using the old national calendars and spaces for these new purposes. As John Bodnar notes, the experience of the American bicentennial celebrations suggests that people now find much more meaning in local than in national commemorations, forcing the latter to acquiesce to a new pluralism of celebrations. The fact that family genealogists now outnumber professional historians in the archives of France and elsewhere is yet further evidence of the same tendency toward the personalization of memory.⁴⁷

Yet the recent proliferation of anniversaries, memorial services, and ethnic celebrations suggests that, while memory has become more democratic, it has also become more burdensome.⁴⁸ Today, time takes no prisoners. Pockets of pastness—ethnic neighborhoods, rural backwaters, the intact family—are fast disappearing. Those who were once perceived as our connection to the past—old people, women, immigrants, minorities—are now swimming in the same flood of change that previously created such a profound sense of loss among elite males. Grandparents are no longer doing the memory work they once performed. In particular families, it is wives and mothers who pick up the slack. Every attic is an archive, every living room a museum. Never before has so much been recorded, collected; and never before has remembering been so compulsive, even as rote memorization ceases to be central to the educational process. What we can no longer keep in our heads is now kept in storage.

It seems that as collective forms of memory decline an increasing burden is placed on the individual. One is reminded of one of Jorge Luis Borges's characters, Funes, the Memorious, who, having fallen off his horse at age nineteen, finds he can forget nothing. Funes laments that he has "more memories in myself alone than all men have had since the world was a world. . . . My memory, sir, is like a garbage disposal."⁴⁹ Today, it is as if we have all suffered Funes's fall, for we are under obligation to remember more and more, due in large part to the fact that in modern society everyone belongs simultaneously to several different groups, each with its own collective memory. Finding ourselves in this demanding situation, we rely on a multitude of devices—calendars, Filofaxes, computerized memory banks—to remind ourselves of that which we as individuals cannot master. Our problem stems not from the brain's inability to remember, but rather from the fact that, as individuals, we cannot rely on the support of collective memory in the same way people in earlier periods could. Dependent on several collective memories, but masters of none, we are only too aware of the gap between the enormous obligation to remember and the individual's incapacity to do so without the assistance of mechanical reminders, souvenirs, and memory sites.

"Modern memory," Nora observes, "is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image."⁵⁰ On one hand, the past has become so distant and the future so uncertain that we can no longer be sure what to save, so we save everything. It seems that every historic dwelling, every species, every landscape is destined to have its own preservation order because "no one knows what the past will be made of next."⁵¹ On the other hand, never has the past been so accessible on film, on tape, and in mass-produced images. Virtually all the songs, television programs, fads and fashions of our childhood and youth are now as close as the library, video store, or flea market. The scale of collecting increases in inverse proportion to our depth perception. Now that old is equated with yesterday, we allow nothing to disappear. And surrounded by a forest of monuments and souvenirs so dense that it makes it virtually impossible to decipher their historical references, so burdened by current compulsion to remember the birthdays and anniversaries of family, schoolmates, and fellow workers that "birthday books have become a standard household item: one's memory is inadequate to record the festivities for which one is responsible."⁵²

Not surprisingly, individual identities are proliferating at precisely the same rate as memories. In contemporary society each of us enters daily into a multitude of situations—home, work, leisure, peer groups—each of which is a world of its own with a distinctive history. Life can no longer be lived sequentially along a single time line; and even elite males can no longer expect the kind of continuity that we used to call a career. As a result of the global economic restructuring that has taken place since the 1960s,

millions of workers have found themselves "recycled," forced to change jobs and locations.⁵³ This, combined with the unprecedentedly high divorce rates since 1970, means that everyone has now as many pasts as he or she has different jobs, spouses, parents, children, or residences.

"In effect, as we move through life, the cast of relevant characters is ever expanding," writes Kenneth Gergen.⁵⁴ Today it is not only rare, but actually frowned upon, to have only one identity. "One of the worst mistakes in middle age is to confine oneself—and to continue to define oneself—by a single source of identity," writes Gail Sheehy.⁵⁵ And this applies on the political as well as on the personal level, as the good fortunes of Kuwaitis with dual citizenship who were able to flee to Cairo or Miami when their country was invaded can testify. Of course, there are those, like the Palestinians, for whom several identities are a tragic burden. But there is no question but that in the transnational world of late twentieth-century capitalism increasing numbers of persons are forced to contend with multiple identities and multiple memories, as they are moved from place to place, time after time.⁵⁶

VIII

It is no wonder that these new conditions have produced a new self-consciousness about identity and memory. Since the 1960s, not only particular memories but memory itself has become the subject of intense public as well as scholarly debate. The study of collective memory, initiated by Halbwachs in the 1930s, has been given new life. Simultaneously, identity has undergone a denaturalization process, with scholars from a wide variety of fields agreeing that it is subjective and constructed.⁵⁷ Yoked together by their common past, memory and identity now undergo the same scrutiny.

It is not surprising that much of the rethinking has taken place in Germany, where the issue of memory has such huge significance and where, as Claudia Koonz's discussion of the current debate about the concentration camps demonstrates, the struggle intensifies rather than diminishes. Since the 1970s, a radical critique of older institutionalized memory practice has developed. Monuments have been subject to particular attention by critics who argue that the traditional memory sites actually discourage engagement with the past and induce forgetting rather than remembering. The leaders of recent avant-garde counter monument movements, many of whom are politically active artists, would have citizens do more rather than less memory work. They advocate radical designs that, like the monument on the Mall, not only invite more interaction, but challenge the status of memory as a knowable object. In 1986 the first of the counter monuments was erected in Harburg, a lead-sheathed obelisk dedicated to the victims of

Nazism that invited the public to inscribe their names and messages on its surfaces. As these were rilled, the obelisk was lowered gradually into the ground, where it eventually disappeared, leaving as its only trace the living memories of those who visited the site previously.⁵⁸

The anti-monument movement represents a radical turn not only aesthetically but epistemologically. Its advocates reject the notion of memory sites and want to deritualize and dematerialize remembering so that it becomes more a part of everyday life, thus closing the gap between the past and the present, between memory and history. By dematerializing memory they also wish to strip it of all appearances of objectivity, thereby forcing everyone to confront her or his own subjectivity, while at the same time acknowledging a civic responsibility not to let the past repeat itself.

Whether these aims are achieved is an open question. It would appear that most people find it difficult to remember without having access to mementos, images, and physical sites to objectify their memory.⁵⁹ Yet the controversy over the counter monuments is symptomatic of the rethinking of memory practice going on in the United States, Europe, and many other parts of the world. Museum reformers have also begun to search for new ways to engage visitors. Movements to liberate history from its association with particular times and places—the classroom, library, and archive—have been active since the 1960s.⁶⁰ These efforts coincide with a remarkable surge in the popular historical practice. The "roots" phenomenon has inspired mass interest in genealogy, producing in the case of the Mormons what Alex Shoumatoff aptly describes as a "mountain of names."⁶¹ Virtually every community, religion, business, and voluntary association must now have its own history, just as it must have its own identity.

Today everyone is her or his own historian, and this democratization of the past-causes some anxiety among professionals, most of whom still "write in the nationalist tradition, and who still retain a near monopoly over professorships and curatorships, even as they lose touch with the general public. Most people have long since turned to more heterogeneous representations of the past. And while conservatives decry Americans' lack of factual knowledge about their national history, fearing the loss of a common heritage will lead to a loss of national identity, the reality is that the nation is no longer the site or frame of memory for most people and therefore national history is no longer a proper measure of what people really know about their pasts.⁶² In fact, there is good evidence to show that ordinary people are more interested in and know more about their pasts than ever before, though their knowledge is no longer confined to compulsory time frames and spaces of the old national historiography. Both Americans and Europeans have become compulsive consumers of the past, shopping for that which best suits their particular sense of self at the moment, constructing out of a bewildering variety of materials, times, and

places the multiple identities that are demanded of them in the post-national era.⁶¹

Eric Davis's contribution on the politics of museum building in Iraq suggests that the old compulsory forms of commemoration survive, but only where states are still in the process of constructing a singular national identity. Yet even in dictatorships it is not clear how long this monopoly will last. Identity politics are becoming as divisive in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia as they are in Western Europe and North America. Everywhere the ability to cope with a plurality of pasts is being severely tested, and only time will tell whether societies will be able to tolerate the diversity with which they are now confronted.

IX

It seems clear that we are experiencing not just another intellectual fad but a deep cultural shift, whose dynamics remind us of the struggles at the time of the Reformation that pitted anti-ritualistic, iconoclastic Protestants against the older Catholic practices of locating the sacred only in certain times and places. Radical Protestants demanded that the sacred be brought into everyday life, into history itself; and to do so they abolished the separation of holy from secular days, insisting that the divine leave its old haunts—churches and pilgrimage sites—to become a part of the workplace, the household, to be identified with the history of peoples (at first reforming sects, later with whole nations) chosen by God to carry out his divine purpose in secular time and space.

At its most extreme the goal was nothing short of the deinstitutionalization of religion and its internalization in the hearts and minds of all believers. At first, this required the separation of the chosen people, a journey, as in the case of the Puritans who migrated to America, into the "wilderness" where a New Jerusalem beckoned. In time, the Protestant notion of the chosen few would expand to include all who were willing to pledge their allegiance to God's chosen nation. The homeland became the New Jerusalem.

In the end, the Reformation contributed not to the sacralization of the world, but to its secularization. Protestants displaced the cosmopolitanism of Catholicism with territorially based churches, more closely aligned with nation-states. Their territories became the secular equivalent of the old holy places, soil sanctified by the blood of heroic ancestors. To defend its position, the once universal Catholic church was forced to make alliance with its ancient rival, the monarchical state. By the end of the eighteenth century, the relationship between the two was so close that revolutionary movements saw no alternative but to separate church and state, replacing God with History, saints with secular martyrs. In revolutionary France the

great events of the nation's history took on the sacred significance once reserved only for holy days.⁶⁴

In the course of the nineteenth century nations came to worship themselves through their pasts, ritualizing and commemorating to the point that their sacred sites and times became the secular equivalent of shrines and holy days. There was always a certain amount of ambivalence about memory among those nations born of revolution. Although the Americans were relatively quick to designate certain men as Founding Fathers, they wished to keep the revolution alive in each new generation. "Democracy has no monuments. It strikes no medals. It bears the head of no man on a coin," declared John Quincy Adams.⁶⁵ Initially, the French revolutionaries did everything possible to forget their ancestry. As Balzac put it, "by cutting off the head of Louis XVI, the Republic cut off the heads of all fathers of families."⁶⁶ Too much remembering was initially regarded as counter-revolutionary, though, in time, the French, like the Americans, would strike their medals and erect their monuments.

From the mid-nineteenth century onward history became the modern world's oracle. The terrible consequences of collective self-worship eventually became evident in the course of two world wars, but it took until the 1960s for a new iconoclasm to develop. This time the attack was directed not against the churches but against the schools, the universities, and the shrines and holidays of the nation-state, whose representations of itself had become too impersonal, totalizing, and alienating. The task then became one of finding usable pasts capable of serving the heterogeneity of new groups that had become active on the national and international stage: racial and sexual minorities, women, youth, and dozens of new nations and ethnic groups aspiring to sovereign status.

In many respects this secular reformation has been remarkably successful in desacralizing the nation-state, but the struggle is not yet over and its most intense period may be ahead of us. For those who regard the national "heritage" as a sacred text, the democratization of memory is equivalent to profanation, or, what is worse, cultural suicide. Just as some accuse the anti-monument movement of "manufacturing oblivion," there are those who regard any revision of the traditional curriculum as threatening national security. Reformers reply that all literary canons, standardized texts, and preferred lists of names and dates are themselves deadly, cutting off the present from the past, discouraging rather than enhancing active citizenship.

Of course, taking memory out of the hands of specialists, diffusing its practices over time and space, runs the risk of merely privatizing rather than really democratizing it. Today packaged forms of both memory and history have proved so profitable that we must be wary of the results of commodification and commercialization as much as the consequences of

..political manipulation^ Yet there are also examples of collective memorial-ization that owe little or nothing to either the market or to church and state. In the wake of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, there was a spontaneous, uncoordinated proliferation of "booklets of commemoration" honoring the memory of Israeli soldiers killed in combat. Often consisting of only a few mimeographed pages, and mainly secular in character, they were entirely the work of friends, family, and colleagues, a testament to the vitality of collective memory in modern society.⁶⁷ One could easily add many other more recent examples.

X

There is a chance that, like Funes, the Memorious, we may drown in floods of memories, just as we may be torn apart by the multitude of identities. The future is unpredictable, and not a little frightening, but there is no turning back. We have no alternative but to construct new memories as well as new identities better suited to the complexities of a post-national era. The old holidays and monuments have lost much of their power to commemorate, to forge and sustain a single vision of the past, but they remain useful as times and places where groups with very different memories of the same events can communicate, appreciate, and negotiate their respective differences. In this difficult and conflicted period of transition, democratic societies need to publicize rather than privatize the memories and identities of all groups, so that each may know and respect the other's versions of the past, thereby understanding better what divides as well as unites us.⁶⁸ In this era of plural identities, we need civil times and civil spaces more than ever, for these are essential to the democratic processes by which individuals and groups come together to discuss, debate, and negotiate the past and, through this process, define the future.

NOTES

1. They do not appear in the 1976 or 1983 editions of Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

2. Philip Gleason, "Identifying Identity: A Semantic History," *Journal of American History*, vol. 69, no. 4 (March 1983), p. 913.

3. For a review of recent approaches, see Barry Schwartz, "The Social Control of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory," *Social Forces*, vol. 61, no. 2 (December 1982). Among the classic studies of memory are F.C. Bartlett, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932); Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, trans. F.J. Ditter (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). Much of the new work on memory is psychological, but there is now a growing interest in the social and political dimen-

sions. See Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Thomas Butler, ed., *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).

4. See Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Clamon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 98-99; and Natalie Zemon Davis and Randolph Starn, "Introduction to Special Issue on Memory and Counter Memory," *Representations*, no. 25 (Spring 1989), p. 2.

5. Valentine Moghadam, "Introduction," *Women and Identity Politics in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective*, forthcoming.

6. Kenneth J. Gergen, *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1991), chap. 3.

7. Eric Leed, remarks made at Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis, April 1991. Also see his *Mind of the Traveller: From Gilgamesh to Global Tourism* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

8. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

9. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 6.

10. For new work on private memory, see Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson, eds., *Myths We Live By* (New York: Routledge, 1990). On the need to work out the history of memory (or, more properly, memories), see Davis and Starn, "Introduction," p. 2.

11. What is known about ancient and medieval forms of memory is summarized by Le Goff, *History and Memory*, pp. 51-81.

12. Georges Duby, "Solitude: Eleventh to Thirteenth Century," *A History of Private Life*, ed. Georges Duby (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 619-20.

13. Henry Glassie, *Passing the Time in Ballymenone: Culture and History of an Ulster Community* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), p. 353.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

15. Richard Gough, *The History of Myddle*, ed. David Hey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 96; on the role of older males as "memory-men," see Le Goff, *History and Memory*, pp. 73-74.

16. Glassie, *Passing the Time in Ballymenone*, pp. 352-53.

17. Le Goff, *History and Memory*, pp. 81-90.

18. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Memoire*," *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989), p. 7; the fate of living memory in a French village has been carefully studied by Francoise Zonabend, *The Enduring Memory: Time and History in a French Village*, trans. Anthony Forster (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1984).

19. On America, see David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 105-13; on the French Revolutionary calendar, see Eviatar Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms: Schedules and Calendars in Social Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 82-96.

20. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991), chap. 11.

21. On the invention of the "Old Regime" see Pierre Goubert, *L'ancien regime*

(Paris: Colin, 1969); also Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), part 1.

22. Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

23. John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), chap. 2; also Barry Schwartz, *George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol* (New York: Free Press, 1987).

24. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 7.

25. Edward Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966), especially pp. 418—29; on the uses of memory by the middle classes, see Patrick Joyce, *Work, Society, and Politics: The Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian England* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980), chap. 4. The effort to shape a national past through the creation of certain national traditions is explored in Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914," in *The Invention of Tradition*, pp. 263-307.

26. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

27. Susan G. Davis, *Parades and Power: Street Theatre in 'nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 166—73; also Mary Ryan, *Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825-1880* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). I thank Professor Philip Nord for the information on Bastille Day.

28. Schwartz, *George Washington*, pp. 376-77; Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, pp. 70-71.

29. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 19.

30. Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1991), p. 120. On the efforts by W.E.B. Du Bois to construct a viable memory for African Americans left out of historical pageantry, see David Glassberg, *American Historical Pageantry: The Use of Tradition in the Early Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 132.

31. These are some of the themes explored in John Gillis, *Our Imagined Families: The Origins of the Myths and Rituals We Live By* (New York: Basic Books, forthcoming).

32. Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class*, pp. 60—66; further, Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789—1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Marina Warner, *Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of Female Forms* (New York: Atheneum, 1985).

33. I owe this insight to Victoria Smith, who is currently completing her dissertation on memorial statues of Queen Victoria in Britain, Canada, and India.

34. See Thomas Richards, "The Image of Victoria in the Year of Jubilee," in his *Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and Spectacle, 1851 — 1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), chap. 2. On Mother's Day, see Karin Hausen, "Mothers, Sons, and the Sale of Symbols and Goods: German Mother's Days, 1923—1933," in H. Medick and D. Sabean, eds., *Interest and Emotion*

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 371—413; and J. Gillis, *For Better for Worse: British Marriages 1600 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 253-54.

35. Notable American women have received recognition only through stamps and local monuments. A statue of Susan B. Anthony exists in the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., but it is in an obscure corner of the lower floor. On the struggle of African Americans to claim a national memory site, see Scott Sandage, "A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963," *Journal of American History*, vol. 8, no. 1 (June 1993), pp. 135-167.

36. Philippe Aries, *The Hour of Our Death* (New York: Vintage, 1982), chap. 11; Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, pp. 39ff.

37. I owe the information on spiritualism to J.M. Winter, who is currently writing *The Persistence of Tradition: The Cultural History of Bereavement in the Period of the Great War*.

38. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, chap. 5.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 102ff.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-54.

41. *Ibid.*, chap. 10. On the most recent phase of the German politics of memory: Charles Maier, "Remembering and Forgetting: The Third Reich and the G.D.R.," lecture at Rutgers University, April 18, 1991.

42. Carol Gluck, "The Disappearing Past: Public Memory in Contemporary Japan," lecture at Rutgers University, April 18, 1991.

43. Allan Berube, *Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two* (New York: Free Press, 1990).

44. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, pp. 221-25.

45. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 16.

46. Steven Weisman, "Pearl Harbor in the Mind of Japan," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 3, 1991, pp. 30-33, 42, 47, 68. On the struggle for German memory, see Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

47. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 15; similar trends are documented by David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, chap. 7.

48. On the proliferation of official anniversaries, see William M. Johnston, *Celebrations: The Cult of Anniversaries in Europe and the United States* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991).

49. Jorge Luis Borges, *Ficciones*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 112. The Borges story was called to my attention by Yosef Haym Vrushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), p. 102.

50. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 13.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

52. Gergen, *The Saturated Self*, p. 62; also John Gillis, "Remembering Memory: Challenge for Public Historians in a Post-National Era," *The Public Historian*, vol. 14, no. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 83—93; on the growth of birthday celebrations, see P. Chudacoff, *How Old Are You? Age Consciousness in American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), chap. 6.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 371-413; and J. Gillis, *For Better for Worse: British Marriages 1600 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 253-54.

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36. Philippe Aries, *The Hour of Our Death* (New York: Vintage, 1982), chap. 11; Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, pp. 39ff.

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38. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, chap. 5.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 102ff.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-54.

41. *Ibid.*, chap. 10. On the most recent phase of the German politics of memory: Charles Maier, "Remembering and Forgetting: The Third Reich and the G.D.R.," lecture at Rutgers University, April 18, 1991.

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44. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers*, pp. 221-25.

45. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 16.

46. Steven Weisman, "Pearl Harbor in the Mind of Japan," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 3, 1991, pp. 30-33, 42, 47, 68. On the struggle for German memory, see Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

47. Nora, "Between Memory and History," p. 15; similar trends are documented by David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country*, chap. 7.

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53. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), parts 3 & 4; also John Gillis, "The Case against Chronologization: Changes in the Anglo-American Life Cycle, 1600 to the Present," *Ethnologia Europea*, vol. 17, no. 2 (1988), pp. 97-106.

54. Gergen, *The Saturated Self*, p. 62.

55. Gail Sheehy, *Pathfinders* (New York: Morrow, 1981), p. 294.

56. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, passim; "A New Divide for Kuwaitis: Who Stayed and Who Flew," *New York Times*, Oct. 12, 1991.

57. The new interest in memory is documented by Schwartz, "The Social Control of Commemoration"; Davis and Starn, "Introduction"; Kammen, *Mystic Chords*; Connerton, *How Societies Remember*; and the special issue of the *Journal of American History* on memory in March 1989.

58. James Young, "The Counter Monument: Memory Against Itself in Germany Today,"

Critical Inquiry, vol. 18, no. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 267-96; also his *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993).

59. On the objectification of memory in family settings, see Asa Boholm, *Swedish Kinship: An Exploration into Cultural Processes of Belonging and Continuity* (Goteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1983), chap. 4; on the issue of

objectification generally, see Eviatar Zerubavel, *The Fine Line: Making Distinctions in Everyday Life* (New York: Free Press, 1991), passim.

60. A useful survey of these trends is provided by David Thelen, "History-Making in America: A Populist Perspective" (Laramie: Wyoming Council on the Humanities, 1991); revised and reprinted in *The Historian*, vol. 53, no. 4 (Summer 1991), pp. 633-48.

61. Alex Shoumatoff is referring not only to the current fascination with family history, but to the Utah range where the Mormons secure the computer tapes of their massive collection of the names of those they expect to sponsor to eternal life. Shoumatoff, *The Mountain of Names: A History of the Human Family* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

62. See Michael Frisch, "American History and the Structures of Collective Memory: A Modern Exercise in Empirical Iconography," *Journal of American History*, vol. 75, no. 4 (March 1989), pp. 1130-55.

63. Gergen, *The Saturated Self*, pp. 75-77.

64. Zerubavel, *Hidden Rhythms*, pp. 82-100.

65. Kammen, *Mystic Chords*, p. 19.

66. Quoted in Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 72-73.

67. The creation of thousands of "books of commemoration" is described by Emmanuel Sivan in *The 1948 War* [Hebrew], Tel Aviv, 1991. I am indebted to Professor Sivan for sharing his ideas with me. An English translation of his book is forthcoming.

68. This point is made eloquently by Le Goff, *History and Memory*, p. 99.